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WARNING: A POST-SALE DUTY TO WARN TARGETS SMALL 
MANUFACTURERS 
 
Jill Wieber Lens∗ 
 
The majority of states now obligate manufacturers to warn about 
dangers of their products that are discoverable after the sale. 
Commentators and courts have been hesitant about this obligation 
because of the potential burden it puts on manufacturers—the costs of 
identifying users and warning them of the danger. The consensus is that 
only a factually dependent post-sale duty to warn should exist, obligating 
manufacturers to warn only if a reasonable manufacturer would do so. A 
reasonable manufacturer, of course, would warn only if the danger to be 
warned of justifies the costs of the warning.  
This Article is the first to identify a problem with a factually 
dependent post-sale duty to warn—it will most likely result in liability for 
small manufacturers, but not large manufacturers. This is because the 
costs of issuing the warning for a small manufacturer will always be 
smaller than for a large manufacturer. This Article is also the first to 
argue that a factually dependent post-sale duty to warn is inconsistent 
with the underlying purposes of products liability law and general public 
policy. Although the factually dependent post-sale duty to warn seems 
like a perfect solution to the overburdening problem, courts should not 
adopt it.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
If you want to see people squirm, we recommend that you gather 
representatives from industry in a room and then flash the words “post-
sale warnings” on a screen. The reaction is guaranteed. The reason is 
simple. It is one thing to tell a manufacturer that it has the duty to 
provide an initial warning with the product.1 
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1 JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, TEACHER’S MANUAL—
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 162 (7th ed. 2011). 
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But it is another thing to tell manufacturers that they could owe a duty to warn 
after they have sold the product—practically, a duty to identify users and warn 
them of a newly materialized danger. As explained by the authors of the Third 
Restatement of Torts: Products Liability (“Third Restatement”), it is a “monster 
duty,” a “seemingly . . . timeless duty to warn.”2  
More than half of the states and the Third Restatement have adopted a post-
sale duty to warn. But this is not a reason for manufacturers to hide in fear—at 
least not all of them. Most of these states have adopted a post-sale duty that is 
factually dependent. The duty will exist only if a reasonable manufacturer would 
have warned, which is true only if the costs of issuing the warning were 
reasonable. The Third Restatement explains, and commentators agree, this 
factually dependent inquiry is necessary to ensure a post-sale duty to warn does not 
“impose unacceptable burdens on product” manufacturers.3 Because the costs are 
relevant, large manufacturers that distribute their products widely to a large 
number of customers need not be worried. If issuing a warning would necessitate 
identifying and contacting three million customers all spread across a region, no 
duty would likely exist.  
This Article is the first to explore a problem with the well-intentioned 
factually dependent post-sale duty to warn—a problem that should make small 
manufacturers squirm. Unlike a large manufacturer, a small manufacturer is likely 
to have fewer customers located in a geographically distinct area. The small 
manufacturer may even have continuing contact with those customers, and it 
would not be very expensive for a small manufacturer to warn its customers. Thus, 
a small manufacturer would owe a post-sale duty to warn and face liability for 
failing to warn.  
This type of factually dependent duty to warn—likely owed by small 
manufacturers but not large manufacturers—is inconsistent with the underlying 
theories of products liability. Those underlying theories support a broad post-sale 
duty to warn, obligating all manufacturers, not just the small manufacturers. A 
factually dependent post-sale duty to warn is also inconsistent with general public 
policy. Small manufacturers are already especially vulnerable to the effects of 
products liability law and have difficulty obtaining products liability insurance. 
This difficulty will increase now that only small manufacturers face a new form of 
liability for post-sale conduct. 
Ultimately, a broad post-sale duty to warn could be very burdensome on 
manufacturers because of the costs of warning. A factually dependent version of 
the duty, however, likely protects only larger manufacturers from those costs. If 
those costs are real and valid, the solution is to reject any post-sale duty to warn, 
ensuring that all manufacturers are treated the same. 
Part II of this Article explores the differences between the point-of-sale 
warning obligation and a possible post-sale warning obligation. Part III uses case 
                                                     
2 Id.  
3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. a (1998) [hereinafter 
THIRD RESTATEMENT]. 
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law and the Third Restatement factors to explain how a factually dependent post-
sale duty to warn is more likely to create a post-sale warning obligation for small 
manufacturers than for large manufacturers. Part IV argues that because of the 
effect on small manufacturers, a factually dependent post-sale duty is inconsistent 
with the theories underlying products liability law and with general public policy. 
Part V concludes by arguing the courts should reject any post-sale duty to warn 
that creates different obligations for different manufacturers. That likely means 
that courts should reject any post-sale duty to warn. 
 
II.  WHAT IS A POST-SALE DUTY TO WARN? 
 
The best way to understand a post-sale duty to warn is to compare it to the 
well-accepted manufacturer’s point-of-sale duty to warn.4  
 
A.  The Basics of a Point-of-Sale Warning 
 
Manufacturers “have a duty to provide consumers with warnings of hidden 
product dangers and instructions on how products may be safely used.”5 The duty 
is not to warn of all hidden dangers, however. Instead, the manufacturer is 
obligated to warn of the foreseeable dangers—the dangers about which the 
manufacturer knew or should have known at the time of sale.6 
Liability for failure to warn is based in negligence.7 If a reasonable 
manufacturer would have warned about the foreseeable dangers, a defendant is 
                                                     
4 This Article refers to the “manufacturer” instead of “seller.” The common law 
obligates both manufacturers and sellers to warn. See id. § 1 cmt. e. At the same time, 
“[l]egislation has been enacted in many jurisdictions that, to some extent, immunizes 
nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors from strict liability.” Id. A seller would not likely 
be liable for either a point-of-sale failure to warn or a post-sale failure to warn if it had no 
involvement in the creation of the warning. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 82.003 (West 2011). Thus, I will refer only to the manufacturer as possibly owing a post-
sale duty to warn. 
5 DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 9.1 (2d ed. 2008). 
6 Richter v. Limax Int’l, Inc., 45 F.3d 1464, 1471 (10th Cir. 1995) (explaining that 
manufacturers have a duty to warn of harms “reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer of 
the product” and that “a manufacturer cannot be held liable for harm that no reasonable 
person could anticipate”). 
7 Some courts still pretend the standard is based in strict liability, but others admit a 
“strict liability” failure to warn claim is no different than a negligent failure to warn claim. 
See, e.g., Anguiano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 44 F.3d 806, 811–12 (9th Cir. 
1995) (stating that “the question whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn under strict 
liability depends on the standards for determining a duty to warn under a negligence 
action”); Klem v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 19 F.3d 997, 1001–03 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that failure-to-warn claims in strict liability and in negligence duplicate one 
another); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that although 
the negligence and strict liability theories may be phrased differently, the issue is generally 
the same: “was the warning adequate?”); Sell v. Bertsch & Co., 577 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 
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liable if it failed to act similarly. A defendant cannot be liable for failing to warn of 
dangers that were unforeseeable at the time of the sale. Instead, a defendant can be 
liable only if it was at fault. That is, it failed to warn about the foreseeable dangers, 
the same dangers about which a reasonable manufacturer would warn.  
It is still possible for liability for a failure to warn to be strict. That is how the 
New Jersey Supreme Court defined the warning obligation in Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Products Corp.8 There, the court affirmed liability for a manufacturer’s 
failure to warn about the dangers of asbestos—dangers that, according to the 
defendant’s allegations, were unknown to even the scientific community at the 
time the product was sold.9 The court defined a strict liability warning obligation, 
and any argument that the defendant “could not have known the product was 
dangerous” was irrelevant to a theory of strict liability.10  
But “American courts and commentators have widely (if not quite 
universally) rejected this kind of ‘super-strict’ liability on grounds of fairness, 
logic, and practicality.”11 The main reason for the criticism of Beshada and the 
rejection of strict liability for failure to warn is that strict liability would be too 
harsh and unfair. Requiring warnings of unknowable risks is essentially requiring 
the impossible. “A manufacturer cannot fairly be required to issue warnings at the 
point of sale of dangers about which it did not know and could not have 
                                                     
(D. Kan. 1984) (“Under either theory, the duty to warn is one of ordinary care.”); Leesley 
v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that where the issue regards a 
manufacturer’s failure to warn, “the manufacturer’s duty is essentially the same under 
either a negligence or [a] strict liability theory”); Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 
289 (Iowa 1994) (“After reviewing the authorities and comments on the failure to warn 
question, we believe any posited distinction between strict liability and negligence 
principles is illusory.”); Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 (Ohio 
1990) (“[T]he standard imposed upon the defendant in a strict liability claim grounded 
upon an inadequate warning is the same as that imposed in a negligence claim based upon 
inadequate warning.”). 
8 447 A.2d 539, 545 (N.J. 1982). 
9 Id. at 546. There was a “substantial factual dispute about what defendants knew and 
when they knew it.” Id. at 542. For purposes of resolving the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss, though, the court assumed the defendants had a lack of knowledge. Id. at 543. 
10 Id. at 546. 
11 OWEN, supra note 5, § 9.2, at 592; THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 2 cmt. a 
(explaining that the rationale for imposing strict liability does not apply to defects based on 
inadequate instruction or warning). Even the New Jersey Supreme Court found differently 
a few years later in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984). In 
Feldman, the potentially defective products at issue were prescription drugs. Id. at 376–77. 
And when prescription drugs were at issue, the court held that drug manufacturers were 
obligated to warn only of “dangers of which they know or should have known on the basis 
of reasonably obtainable or available knowledge” at the time of sale. Id. at 376. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court also noted in Feldman that its decision in Beshada had been heavily 
criticized. Id. at 387–88. 
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known . . . .”12 Thus, manufacturers are obligated to warn only of dangers about 
which they knew or should have known at the time of sale. 
Notably, the fault analysis for the point-of-sale warning obligation considers 
what the defendant knew and what it should have known. The fault analysis does 
not consider the costs of issuing a point-of-sale warning. That is because the costs 
are negligible: “the cost of giving an adequate warning is usually so minimal, 
amounting only to the expense of adding some more printing to a label.”13 
Obviously, the costs of the injury that result from the inadequate warning outweigh 
“a few pennies for a bit more paper and a little more ink.”14 Thus, a reasonable 
manufacturer would always warn of the foreseeable dangers. 
                                                     
12 Victor Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road 
to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892, 896–97 (1983). 
13 Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 15 (Md. 1975); see also Johnston v. United 
States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 359–60 (D. Kan. 1983) (explaining that point-of-sale warnings 
would be “trivial in cost”); Moran, 332 A.2d at 15 (discussing that balancing the costs of 
adding a warning against the benefits resulting from that warning “will almost always 
weigh in favor of an obligation to warn of latent dangers”); Wheeler v. Gen. Tire & Rubber 
Co., 419 N.W.2d 331, 339 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that the cost of added point-of-
sale warnings would have been “very small”); Paul D. Rheingold & Susan B. Feinglass, 
Risk-Utility Analysis in the Failure to Warn Context, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 357 
(1997) (explaining that the “suppliers’ costs of providing a warning” are 
“always . . . negligible”). 
Arguably, there are costs associated with issuing the point-of-sale warning. See James 
A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The 
Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 297 (1990) (arguing that “judges 
and juries . . . assume erroneously that warnings are virtually costless”); see also Karin L. 
Bohmholdt, Note, The Heeding Presumption and Its Application: Distinguishing No 
Warning from Inadequate Warning, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 461, 477 (2003) (explaining that 
“there are collateral costs associated with providing warnings” including the “costs 
associated with lost profits from a product containing too many warnings or the costs 
associated with ‘lost effect’ of an important warning among multiple, less necessary 
ones”). If a product contains too many warnings, consumers may disregard them. 
Henderson & Twerski, supra, at 296; see also Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prod. Co., 840 F.2d 
935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“The inclusion of each extra item dilutes the punch of every 
other item. Given short attention spans, items crowd each other out; they get lost in fine 
print.”). Plus, there is a limit to how much information each warning can include. Id. (“If 
every foreseeable possibility must be covered, ‘[t]he list of foolish practices warned against 
would be so long, it would fill a volume.’” (quoting Kerr v. Koemm, 557 F. Supp. 283, 288 
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). “Even a court which knows, in the abstract, that a limit will 
ultimately be reached, has no immediate sense of whether the case before it pushes the 
warning package beyond the appropriate constraints.” Henderson & Twerski, supra, at 301. 
It is difficult to argue these costs, however, because there is “no available body of hard 
science from which to draw the data.” Id. at 298. 
14 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 13, at 297; see also Ross Labs. v. Thies, 725 
P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska 1986) (“The cost of giving an adequate warning is usually so 
minimal, i.e., the expense of adding more printing to a label, that the balance must always 
be struck in favor of the obligation to warn where there is a substantial danger which will 
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B.  The Basics of a Post-Sale Duty to Warn 
 
A post-sale warning is a warning issued after the sale of the product. It 
addresses dangers that the seller discovered, or should have discovered, after the 
sale. These are most likely dangers that were unknowable at the time of sale—the 
type of danger for which the defendant could not be liable for failing to warn at the 
point-of-sale. But if the manufacturer discovers or should have discovered a danger 
after the sale, a post-sale duty would obligate the manufacture to warn users, 
possibly years after that sale, of that newly materialized danger.  
To illustrate the difference, consider an illustration from the Third 
Restatement:  
 
ABC has manufactured and distributed vacuum cleaners commercially to 
millions of consumers over the course of many years. . . . Five years after 
the first commercial distribution of Model 14, ABC discovers a risk 
when the Model 14 is used to vacuum dust from a chemical carpet 
cleaner newly introduced to the market. No reasonable person in ABC’s 
position would have foreseen the risk previously, and thus the Model 14 
was not defective at time of original sale.15  
                                                     
not be recognized by the ordinary user.”); OWEN, supra note 5, § 9.2, at 591 (explaining 
that “the safety benefits of adding a sufficient warning virtually always exceed its monetary 
costs”).  
15 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. e, illus. 2. Courts that have adopted a 
post-sale duty to warn differ regarding whether the later-discoverable danger (triggering 
the need for a warning) must be related to a defect existing at the time of sale. Under the 
Third Restatement version, a post-sale duty to warn exists “whether or not the product is 
defective at the time of original sale.” Id. § 10 cmt. a. Many states, however, have required 
that a latent and undetectable design defect exist at the time of sale for a manufacturer to 
owe a duty to warn of the later revealed danger. Kenneth Ross, Post-Sale Duty to Warn: A 
Critical Cause of Action, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 339, 347 (2000); see also DAVID G. 
OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11.2, at 688 (3d. ed. 2000); 
see, e.g., Romero v. Int’l Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444, 1450 (10th Cir. 1992) (limiting the 
post-sale duty to warn to “defects in design, existing but unknown or unappreciated at the 
time of the original sale, which are subsequently discovered by the manufacturer”); Patton 
v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1313 (Kan. 1993) (recognizing a post-
sale duty to warn “when a defect, which originated at the time the product was 
manufactured” is later discovered).  
There is no obvious need for liability for a post-sale failure to warn if a design defect 
also exists. Seemingly, the manufacturer would lack an incentive to issue a warning if the 
product is defectively designed; later issuance of a warning would not negate liability for 
the defective design. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. j. Still, issuing the 
warning could be practically beneficial. If the user is warned, the user may be able to avoid 
injury. Using the example in the accompanying text, the user may not use the vacuum 
cleaner along with the chemical carpet cleaner. If the user is not injured, the manufacturer 
cannot be liable despite the existence of a design defect. Alternatively, if the user operates 
the vacuum cleaner with the chemical carpet cleaner despite being warned, the 
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If a post-sale duty to warn existed, ABC would be obligated to warn its users 
of the newly discovered risk. How exactly would ABC warn its users? Obviously, 
the manufacturer cannot just “change the warning on the product,”16 because the 
product has already left the manufacturer’s control.17 
In order for ABC to warn its users of the newly materialized danger, it will 
have to contact those users. “The manufacturer must try to locate the product, 
identify its users, and advise them about the newly discovered product hazard.”18 
This will be difficult. The more customers, the more arduous this will be. It will be 
even more difficult if the product has changed hands over time—if the original 
purchaser has sold it or given it away.19  
“Even if the effort to identify and contact current product users is successful, 
the cost of such an effort might be intolerable.”20 The writers of the Third 
Restatement agreed. They concluded that “an unbounded post-sale duty to warn 
would impose unacceptable burdens on product sellers,” including undertaking the 
“daunting” “costs of identifying and communicating with product users years after 
sale.”21 The serious potential for overburdening sellers is the reason Illinois courts 
rejected a post-sale duty to warn: “the law does not contemplate placing the 
                                                     
manufacturer would have a basis for a comparative fault defense, reducing the plaintiff’s 
recoverable damages.  
Moreover, if the state requires a plaintiff to establish a point-of-sale design defect in 
order to show a post-sale failure to warn, it will be impossible for a plaintiff to base a post-
sale duty to warn on a failure to disclose a danger not knowable until after sale. A design 
defect exists under the risk-utility test only if “the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced” with an alternative design. Id. § 2(b). If the danger was 
unknowable (and obviously unforeseeable) at the time of sale, no design defect exists. 
Thus, if the danger was unknowable at the time of sale—and only later becomes 
knowable—there can also be no liability for a post-sale failure to warn if the state also 
requires a design defect.  
Regardless of whether the defect must have existed at the time of manufacture, a post-
sale duty to warn is not owed simply because the manufacturer develops a safety 
advancement. OWEN ET AL., supra, § 11.2, at 691. 
16 Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Iowa 1999) (“[O]nce the product is 
sold, a variety of circumstances can impede, if not make impossible, the ability of a 
manufacturer to warn users.”); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 895 (“The warning cannot be 
attached to the product because the product already has been sold.”). 
17 Douglas R. Richmond, Expanding Products Liability: Manufacturers’ Post-Sale 
Duties to Warn, Retrofit and Recall, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 7, 18 (1999) (“Post-sale failure-to-
warn claims are differentiated from point-of-sale failure-to-warn claims by a lack of 
manufacturer control.”). 
18 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 895–96; Richmond, supra note 17, at 19. 
19 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 896; Richmond, supra note 17, at 19. 
20 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 896. 
21 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. a. 
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onerous duty on manufacturers to subsequently warn all foreseeable users of 
products”22 of “defects first discovered after a product has left its control.”23  
Despite the potential for overburdening manufacturers, over half the states 
have adopted a post-sale duty to warn and more are likely to follow given the 
Third Restatement also includes a post-sale duty to warn.24 Those states that have 
                                                     
22 Modelski v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 707 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) 
(quoting Collins v. Hyster Co., 529 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
23 Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co., 955 N.E.2d 1138, 1160 (Ill. 2011) (quoting Modelski, 
707 N.E.2d at 247). Numerous other states have rejected the imposition of a post-sale duty 
to warn including the following: Boatmen’s Trust Co., v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
995 F. Supp. 956, 962 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (Arkansas); Smith v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 
Civ.A 94C-12-002JEB, 2002 WL 31814534, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2002) 
(Delaware); Tober v. Graco Children’s Prods., Inc., 431 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(Indiana); Wicker ex rel. Estate of Wicker v. Ford Motor Co., 393 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1235–
36 (W.D. Okla. 2005) (Oklahoma); Palmer v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 905 So. 2d 564, 
600–01 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (Mississippi); Anderson v. Nissan Motor Co., 139 F.3d 599, 
602 (8th Cir. 1998) (Nebraska); Campbell v. Gala Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A.6:04-2036-RBH, 
2006 WL 1073796, at *4–5 (D.S.C. Apr. 20, 2006) (South Carolina); McLennan v. Am. 
Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 430 (5th Cir. 2001) (Texas). Several other states and the 
District of Columbia have not yet addressed whether to impose a general post-sale duty to 
warn, including Alabama, California, D.C., Montana, Nevada, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming. See KENNETH ROSS, AM. BAR ASS’N, POST-SALE DUTY TO 
WARN: A REPORT OF THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY COMMITTEE 68, 72–73, 77, 106–07, 124–
25, 129–30, 134–37 (2004); Jacob R. Swiss, Delayed Discovery of Defect: Duty to Warn?, 
USLAW, Spring/Summer 2014, at 10, 11. 
24 The following states have adopted some sort of post-sale duty to warn: Wilson v. 
U.S. Elevator Corp., 972 P.2d 235, 238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (Arizona); Downing v. 
Overhead Door Corp., 707 P.2d 1027, 1032–34 (Colo. App. 1985) (Colorado); Densberger 
v. United Techs. Corp., 297 F.3d 66, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2002) (Connecticut); Braniff Airways, 
Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453 (2d Cir. 1969) (Florida); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 51-1-11(c) (2000 & Supp. 2013) (Georgia); Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 944 P.2d 1279, 
1300 (Haw. 1997) (Hawaii); Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1313 
(Kan. 1993) (Kansas); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.57(C) (2009) (Louisiana); Owens-
Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 643–46 (Md. 1992) (Maryland); Vassallo v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 923–24 (Mass. 1998) (Massachusetts); Comstock v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 99 N.W.2d 627, 634–35 (Mich. 1959) (Michigan); Hodder v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 833–34 (Minn. 1988) (Minnesota); Dixon v. 
Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 637 A.2d 915, 922 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (New Jersey); 
Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 871 (N.Y. 1984) (New York); Crowston v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401, 406–09 (N.D. 1994) (North Dakota); Temple v. 
Wean United, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267, 272–73 (Ohio 1997) (Ohio); Walton v. Avco Corp., 
610 A.2d 454, 459–60 (Pa. 1992) (Pennsylvania); Kozlowski v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 
275 N.W.2d 915, 923–25 (Wis. 1979) (Wisconsin). 
The following states have adopted the Third Restatement’s post-sale duty or relied on 
it: Jones v. Bowie Indus., Inc., 282 P.3d 316, 335 (Alaska 2012) (Alaska); Lovick v. Wil-
Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 693–96 (Iowa 1999) (Iowa); Jarrett v. Duro-Med Indus., No. 05-
102-JBC, 2007 WL 628146, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 26, 2007) (Kentucky); Hanlan v. 
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adopted the duty have acknowledged the potential burden on manufacturers, as did 
the Third Restatement, which stresses that courts consider the “serious potential for 
overburdening sellers” when examining whether to impose the post-sale duty.25  
In order to protect manufacturers, the states that have adopted a post-sale duty 
have adopted factually dependent versions—the duty will exist only when the facts 
show the manufacturer would not be overburdened if forced to issue the post-sale 
warning.26 The Third Restatement similarly dictates that liability for a failure to 
warn is proper only if a reasonable manufacturer would have issued the post-sale 
warning.27 Plainly, a reasonable manufacturer would have issued a warning only if 
the costs of issuing that warning were reasonable. If the costs are unreasonable, 
then liability is improper. 
This is markedly different than the point-of-sale warning obligation. Certain 
exceptions exist,28 but generally, all manufacturers owe a duty to issue the point-
of-sale warning. The fact finder then decides whether the manufacturer breached 
that duty based on the factual circumstances. With the factually dependent post-
sale duty to warn, however, courts frequently declare that a specific manufacturer 
                                                     
Chandler, No. 4-0259B, 2008 WL 5608253, at *2–3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2008) 
(Massachusetts); In re Mentor Corp. ObTape Transobturator Sling Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
2004 4:08-MD-2004 (CDL), 2013 WL 2421007, at *3 (M.D. Ga. June 3, 2013) 
(Minnesota); Jenks v. Textron, Inc., No. 09-cv-205-JD, 2012 WL 2871686, at *2 (D.N.H. 
July 10, 2012) (New Hampshire); Robinson v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 500 F.3d 691, 
697–98 (8th Cir. 2007) (South Dakota); Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp., No. 2:99-CV-
00503DAK, 2008 WL 4250049, at *4–5 (D. Utah Sept. 9, 2008) (Utah); Rash v. Stryker 
Corp., 589 F. Supp. 2d 733, 735–36 (W.D. Va. 2008) (Virginia); Daniel v. Coleman Co., 
599 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (Washington).  
Additionally, “[b]y statute and by decisional law, the seller of prescription products 
has always been held to have a continuing duty to advise governmental authorities of new 
information regarding risk levels in use of his products, and to employ on an ongoing basis 
their scientific and medical expertise to discover and advise health care professionals of 
new hazard related information.” M. Stuart Madden, Modern Post-Sale Warnings and 
Related Obligations, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 33, 39–40 (2000). This is not controversial 
because drug manufacturers need only warn doctors, and it is not difficult to locate and 
contact doctors. 
25 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. a. 
26 See, e.g., Robinson, 500 F.3d at 697–98 (applying South Dakota law and finding no 
violation of the duty to warn where the long passage of time would make it unreasonable 
for the manufacturer to locate all owners of its product and the manufacturer had already 
conducted a reasonable “post-sale warning campaign”).  
27 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10(a); see also Schwartz, supra note 12, at 
896 (explaining that “cost should be considered in determining whether a manufacturer has 
made a reasonable effort to warn product users” and that the “facts of a particular case . . . 
should all be relevant in determining” liability for post-sale failure to warn). 
28 For instance, manufacturers do not have to warn of “risks that are either obvious, 
known to the affected party, or both.” OWEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 9.1, at 519. Similarly, 
“there is no duty to give a warning to members of a trade or profession against dangers 
generally known to that group.” Id. § 9.8, at 568. Exceptions to the duty to warn also exist 
for sellers of bulk materials and raw materials. See generally id. § 9.9. 
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does not even owe a duty to warn because of the factual circumstances. Similarly, 
the Third Restatement’s post-sale duty to warn can be read as a rule where the duty 
would not exist because of the factual circumstances.29  
A factually dependent post-sale duty to warn also differs from a point-of-sale 
duty to warn in its consideration of costs. For the point-of-sale warning, the 
consideration of fault is limited to whether the danger was foreseeable. A 
                                                     
29 Professor Aaron Twerski was one of the co-reporters of the Third Restatement of 
Torts: Products Liability. In separate scholarship, Professor Twerski pointed to the post-
sale duty rule as an example of a no-duty rule that is dependent on the individualized facts 
of the case as opposed to a categorical no-duty rule. See Aaron D. Twerski, The Cleaver, 
the Violin, and the Scalpel: Duty and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 
19–21 (2008). In addition, courts often rely on the facts to find that the defendant did not 
owe a post-sale duty to warn. See, e.g., Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862, 867 (Mass. 
2001) (finding no duty where the facts showed the plaintiff “purchased the product at least 
second hand, sixteen years after it was originally sold, and did not own the product until 
years after a duty to provide additional warnings arguably arose”). Professor Twerski made 
his observation in criticizing the version of duty described in drafts of the Third 
Restatement of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm, written by Professors Michael Green 
and William Powers. See Twerski, supra, at 21–25. That version describes that “[n]o-duty 
rules are appropriate only when a court can promulgate relatively clear, categorical, bright-
line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 cmt. a (2010). 
The language of Professor Twerski’s individualized facts no-duty rule in the Third 
Restatement of Torts: Products Liability could also be interpreted as being consistent with 
the brightline duty rules articulated in the Third Restatement of Torts: Liability for Physical 
Harm. It could be read as obligating all manufacturers to issue post-sale warnings, a 
brightline rule, but clarifying that no breach of that duty occurs if a reasonable 
manufacturer would not have issued the post-sale warning. This is more consistent with 
reasonableness’s traditional relevance to breach (and not to duty). Under this interpretation, 
courts do not reject post-sale warning claims because the defendant did not owe a duty, but 
because the unreasonableness of issuing a warning meant the defendant did not breach as a 
matter of law. The Third Restatement of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm includes a 
description of this: 
 
Sometimes reasonable minds cannot differ about whether an actor 
exercised reasonable care under § 8(b). In such cases, courts take the question of 
negligence away from the jury and determine that the party was or was not 
negligent as a matter of law. Courts sometimes inaptly express this result in 
terms of duty. . . . In fact, these cases merely reflect the one-sidedness of the 
facts bearing on negligence, and they should not be misunderstood as cases 
involving exemption from or modification of the ordinary duty of reasonable 
care. 
 
Id. § 7 cmt. i; see also W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 671, 729 (2008) (explaining that when a judge dismisses a case because the plaintiff 
is unable to establish breach as a matter of law, it “requires judges to recognize and 
acknowledge that they are deciding a matter ordinarily left to the jury,” which “imposes an 
appropriate psychological hurdle for a judge before so ruling”).  
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manufacturer owes a duty to warn of foreseeable dangers regardless of the costs of 
that warning. For a post-sale warning, however, both the foreseeability of the 
danger and the costs of the warning are considered in the fault evaluation. A 
reasonable manufacturer would warn only of dangers about which it knows or 
should know and only if those dangers were substantial enough to justify the costs. 
Unlike a point-of-sale warning, a manufacturer may not owe a post-sale duty to 
warn because of the costs of issuing the warning. 
  
III.  UNEVENLY BURDENING SMALL MANUFACTURERS WITH THE FACTUALLY 
DEPENDENT DUTY 
 
Although a factually dependent duty may be a way to ensure manufacturers 
are not overburdened, a factually dependent duty causes another problem. Courts 
have relied on particular facts in finding a post-sale duty to warn. The Third 
Restatement lists those same facts as factors that courts should consider in 
determining whether a post-sale duty to warn should exist. The facts courts have 
used and the Third Restatement factors are more likely to be present in cases where 
the defendant is a small manufacturer with fewer customers than if the defendant is 
a large manufacturer that widely distributes its product.30 
 
A.  Courts Imposing a Duty Based on the Facts 
 
Facts that have motivated courts to impose a post-sale duty to warn include 
whether (1) the defendant sold the product to a small or otherwise limited market, 
(2) the defendant sold a small amount of products, and (3) the defendant 
maintained continuing contact with customers. As illustrated by the cases, these 
factors are more likely to be present if the defendant is a small manufacturer. 
 
1.  Limited or Specialized Market 
 
Several courts have imposed a post-sale duty to warn on manufacturers that 
sold its product to a limited or specialized market. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
for example, imposed a post-sale duty to warn on a manufacturer of a sausage-
stuffing machine in Kozlowski v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co.31 Years after the 
defendant first developed the product, an additional safety feature was invented 
                                                     
30 A factually dependent duty does not de jure obligate only small manufacturers. On 
its face, a factually dependent duty applies neutrally to all manufacturers regardless of their 
size. Despite its neutrality, however, the application of a factually dependent duty will, de 
facto, create unequal obligations and liability for small and large manufacturers. Because of 
the factors used, a factually dependent duty will most likely obligate more small 
manufacturers than large manufacturers to issue a post-sale warning. Similarly, it will more 
likely create liability for small manufacturers than large manufacturers. My argument could 
be resolved as an empirical matter as more states adopt a post-sale duty and more plaintiffs 
pursue that theory of liability. At this point, however, my argument is predictive.  
31 275 N.W.2d 915, 918, 923–25 (Wis. 1979). 
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that would minimize the possibility of an accident due to excessive pressure while 
cleaning the machine.32 This feature was not on the machines purchased by the 
plaintiff’s employer.33 The court confronted the question of “whether there is a 
continuing duty to warn.”34 The court explained that, in determining whether that 
duty exists, the jury “must look to the nature of the industry” along with other 
factors.35  
The nature of the industry helped convince the Wisconsin Supreme Court that 
the sausage-stuffer manufacturer owed a continuing duty to warn of dangers. “The 
sale of a sausage stuffer is to a limited market wherein the manufacturer should 
know of all companies that own its product.”36 Not only should the defendant have 
been able to identify all of its customers, it also had the easy ability to notify them 
through “trade publications that reached 100% of its customers.”37 In fact, the 
defendant had actually advertised the existence of a safety feature that would have 
prevented the plaintiff’s injury in those trade publications,38 and the defendant 
listed the safety feature in its repair parts brochure.39 Because of the limited scope 
of the industry, the manufacturer owed a “continuing duty to warn of an alleged 
defective condition in light of the availability of a . . . safety device.”40 The jury 
would then decide whether the advertisements that the defendant sent out were 
adequate post-sale warnings.41 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania similarly relied on the limited market in 
imposing a post-sale duty in Walton v. Avco Corp.42 Like the sausage-stuffing 
machine in Kozlowski, the product in Walton, a helicopter, was sold to a small 
market.43 The helicopter in question seized mid-flight due to a failure of an oil 
pump in the engine, killing the passengers in the ensuing crash.44 The engine 
manufacturer had issued a Service Instruction advising of the defect and how to 
correct it.45 The engine manufacturer had sent that Service Instruction to the 
helicopter manufacturer, but not to the helicopter’s owners.46 The court determined 
                                                     
32 Id. at 916–17. 
33 Id. at 917. 
34 Id. at 923. 
35 Id. at 924. Those other factors included “warnings given, the intended life of the 
machine, safety improvements, the number of units sold and reasonable marketing 
practices, combined with the consumer expectations inherent therein.” Id. 
36 Id. at 923. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 916, 923. 
39 Id. at 923. 
40 Id. 
41 See id. 
42 610 A.2d 454, 459–60 (Pa. 1992). 
43 Id. at 459. 
44 Id. at 456. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 457. 
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the helicopter manufacturer was under a duty to warn its service centers and the 
purchasers of the affected helicopters.47 
The intermediate court noted the similarities between the case and Kozlowski, 
including the limited market for the sale of the products. 48 Specifically, the court 
noted its “cognizan[ce] of the nature of the helicopter manufacturing industry. A 
helicopter is not a household good, commonly found in almost any home in this 
country. It is . . . a unique and costly product which is manufactured, marketed, 
and sold to a specialized group of consumers.”49 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
similarly relied on the market in affirming the post-sale duty: “[T]he peculiarities 
of the industry also go far to support this imposition of responsibility.”50 The court 
also explained that helicopters “are sold in a small and distinct market.”51  
Although it is possible that any sized manufacturer could sell to a limited 
market, it is generally true that a small manufacturer is more likely to sell to a 
limited market than a large manufacturer. A smaller manufacturer is more likely to 
distribute its products less widely, i.e., less than nationally. Applying this factor of 
selling to a limited market, it is more likely that a small manufacturer would owe a 
post-sale duty to warn.  
Plainly, a court is much less likely to impose a factually dependent post-sale 
duty to warn on a larger manufacturer that widely distributes its products.52 Both 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Kozlowski and the Pennsylvania courts in Walton 
make this clear. The Wisconsin Supreme Court specifically explained that it was 
not holding  
 
that there is an absolute continuing duty, year after year, for all 
manufacturers to warn of a new safety device which eliminates potential 
hazards. A sausage stuffer and the nature of that industry bears no 
similarity to the realities of manufacturing and marketing household 
goods such as fans, snow-blowers [sic] or lawn mowers which have 
become increasingly hazard proof with each succeeding model. It is 
beyond reason and good judgment to hold a manufacturer responsible for 
a duty of annually warning of safety hazards on household items, mass 
produced and used in every American home . . . . It would place an 
unreasonable duty upon these manufacturers if they were required to 
trace the ownership of each unit sold and warn annually of new safety 
improvements . . . .53  
                                                     
47 Id. at 459. 
48 Walton v. Avco Corp., 557 A.2d 372, 378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff’d, 610 A.2d 
454 (Pa. 1992). 
49 Id. at 379. 
50 Walton, 610 A.2d at 459. 
51 Id. 
52 See Richmond, supra note 17, at 43 (explaining that “courts are reluctant to find a 
post-sale duty to warn” if a product is “mass-marketed” and “could get swept away in the 
currents of commerce” (quoting Walton, 610 A.2d at 459) (internal quotations omitted)). 
53 Kozlowski v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 275 N.W.2d 915, 923–24 (Wis. 1979). 
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By pointing out that “[a] helicopter is not a household good,” the intermediate 
Pennsylvania court in Walton similarly implied that it would not find a post-sale 
duty to warn if the product at issue was a product found in every household.54 The 
affirming Pennsylvania Supreme Court echoed that “[h]elicopters are not ‘ordinary 
goods.’ By their nature they are not the types of objects that could get swept away 
in the currents of commerce, becoming impossible to track or difficult to locate. 
Helicopters are not mass-produced or mass-marketed products . . . .”55 Again, if 
helicopters were ordinary household goods widely distributed, a duty would likely 
not exist.56 Accordingly, application of a factually dependent post-sale duty to 
warn is unlikely to result in a duty when the product is distributed widely, as is 
likely the case when the defendant is a large manufacturer. 
 
2.  Number of Products Sold 
 
Related to the size of the market to which the manufacturer sells is the 
number of products the manufacturer sells. If the market is small or specialized, it 
is more likely the manufacturer has not mass-produced products and has instead 
sold a smaller amount. Not surprisingly, courts have looked to the number of 
products sold when determining whether to impose a post-sale duty to warn under 
a factually dependent test.  
In addition to the limited market factual analysis in Kozlowski and Walton, the 
courts relied on the limited number of products sold as a factual basis for imposing 
the post-sale duty to warn. In Kozlowski, the Wisconsin Supreme Court mentioned 
“the number of units sold” as relevant to the determination of duty.57 In fact, the 
number of units sold was so small the manufacturer should have known all of its 
customers because there were not that many of them.58  
In Walton, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted helicopters are a unique 
good and are sold only to limited specialized consumers.59 Again, the manufacturer 
should have known all of its customers because there were not that many of them.  
Distinguishing Walton, a Pennsylvania federal court later refused to impose a 
post-sale duty to warn when the product was a forklift.60 “[W]hile forklifts are not 
common household goods, they are certainly much more prevalent than 
helicopters. Nearly any business which has a loading dock or a warehouse has a 
                                                     
54 Walton, 557 A.2d at 379. 
55 Walton, 610 A.2d at 459. 
56 See Richmond, supra note 17, at 43 (explaining that courts have not imposed a 
post-sale duty to warn in cases involving products that are “ordinary or mass-marketed[,] 
includ[ing] heaters, forklifts, and multipiece tire-rim assemblies”). 
57 See Kozlowski, 275 N.W.2d at 924. 
58 Id. at 923. 
59 Walton, 610 A.2d 459. 
60 Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 797 F. Supp. 381, 388 (M.D. Pa. 1992), vacated, 36 
F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 1994).  
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forklift . . . .”61 Because of the commonality and volume of the products sold, no 
post-sale duty to warn existed.62  
Other courts have also mentioned the relevance of the number of products 
sold to the determination of whether a post-sale duty to warn should exist. In 
Cover v. Cohen,63 New York’s highest court identified “the kind of product 
involved and the number manufactured or sold” as relevant.64 In Crowston v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,65 the North Dakota Supreme Court explained that 
the number of products sold is not determinative of whether a duty exists, but it 
“militates against individualized notice to the original purchasers.”66 In Patton v. 
Hutchinson Wil-Rich Manufacturing Co.,67 the Kansas Supreme Court similarly 
identified the “number of units manufactured or sold” as relevant.68 The evaluation 
of this fact, among others, “may indicate that notice to all ultimate consumers who 
purchased the product prior to the time the manufacturer learned of a potential 
danger is unreasonable.”69  
Just as a smaller manufacturer is more likely to distribute its products to a 
smaller, more limited market, a smaller manufacturer is also more likely to sell 
fewer products, like helicopters or sausage stuffers. This reality means a factually 
dependent post-sale duty to warn is more likely to exist when a small manufacturer 
is before the court. Similarly, a factually dependent post-sale duty is less likely to 
impose a duty on a large manufacturer that distributes its products widely and sells 
a greater volume of products. In that case, the manufacturer is less able to identify 
the users needing to be warned and provide the actual warning. 
 
3.  Continuing Contact with Customers 
 
Courts have been more likely to impose a post-sale duty to warn when the 
manufacturer is in contact with the user who needs to be warned. This was true in 
Kozlowski, Patton, and Walton. The sausage-stuffing machine manufacturer in 
Kozlowski was in an industry in which it should “know of all companies that own 
its product.”70 Plus, the defendant had access to its customers through trade 
journals that reached 100% of its customers.71 The defendant even visited the 
                                                     
61 Id. at 388. 
62 Id. 
63 461 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1984). 
64 Id. at 872. 
65 521 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1994). 
66 Id. at 409. The court further stated that a large volume of products sold also 
“suggests that manufacturers cannot totally ignore post-sale information which has the 
potential to prevent serious injury to so many people.” Id. 
67 861 P.2d 1299 (Kan. 1993). 
68 Id. at 1315. 
69 Id. 
70 Kozlowski v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 275 N.W.2d 915, 923 (Wis. 1979); see 
also id. at 924 (describing the sausage-stuffer machine market as “limited in scope”). 
71 Id. at 923. 
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plaintiff’s employer’s plant twice, but for an unknown reason, the defendant never 
disclosed the danger resulting from excessive pressure or the new safety feature 
that would have eliminated the danger.72 This continuing contact helped convince 
the court a duty existed.  
In Patton, the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that “[n]otification by a 
manufacturer to all prior purchasers of a product may be extremely burdensome, if 
not impossible,” weighing against the imposition of a post-sale duty to warn.73 But 
in that particular case, the manufacturer had a way to reach consumers—its retailer 
had “continuing contact with the consumers.”74 In Walton, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court described the fact the manufacturer had remained in contact with 
the plaintiff “for the very purpose of keeping [him] current on all pertinent 
information” as “[e]ven more important” than the limited market in determining 
that a post-sale duty to warn existed.75  
Maine courts have also recognized the importance of this continuing contact. 
In Brown v. Crown Equipment Corp.,76 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine found 
liability for a failure to warn when the manufacturer knew of the risk, had created a 
kit to help reduce that risk, was in personal contact with the purchaser who was 
injured, and had even evaluated the specific forklift that injured the purchaser.77 
The court had “no difficulty concluding” the manufacturer owed a duty to the 
plaintiff “as a known user of that forklift.”78 The court also characterized the claim 
as a “straightforward negligence claim,” meaning the duty existed because a 
reasonable manufacturer would have issued the post-sale warning under those 
circumstances.79  
A New Jersey court held similarly in Dixon v. Jacobsen Manufacturing Co.80 
In Dixon, the court focused on the fact that the “manufacturer was aware of the 
identity of the current owner of the product.”81 The manufacturer was aware 
because the owner had contacted the manufacturer to request “any information” 
about the machine, covering the fact that an additional safeguard had been added to 
the machinery since the original manufacture.82 The court acknowledged that 
numerous courts had been reluctant to impose a post-sale duty to warn because of 
                                                     
72 See id. 
73 Patton, 861 P.2d at 1314. 
74 Id.; see also Reiss v. Komatsu Am. Corp., 735 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1150 (D.N.D. 
2010) (refusing to grant summary judgment on the basis of a lack of a post-sale duty to 
warn partly because the defendant kept records of products sold). 
75 Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 454, 459 (Pa. 1992). 
76 960 A.2d 1188 (Me. 2008). 
77 Id. at 1193. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. The Maine court further declined to adopt section 10 of the Third Restatement, 
instead “recogniz[ing] a post-sale duty to warn indirect, known purchasers as it applies to 
the facts of this case.” Id. at 1193–94. 
80 637 A.2d 915 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
81 Id. at 922. 
82 Id. at 923. 
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“the burden that such a duty places on manufacturers to ascertain the identity of 
current owners of the product, especially consumer products.”83 But “[n]o such 
policy consideration exists where the owner is known,” as in this case.84 The court 
thus had “no hesitation in holding that such a duty existed.”85  
It is possible for a manufacturer of any size to maintain some type of 
continuing contact with customers. This continuing contact is more likely to occur, 
however, if the manufacturer has a small number of customers, which a small 
manufacturer is likely to have. A small manufacturer may keep in contact with the 
customer for purposes of maintaining the machine, like in Kozlowski, or to ensure 
the customer is kept up to date. This type of continuing contact is more likely to 
occur if it is easy for the manufacturer, such as when there are a limited amount of 
customers. The reality that small manufacturers have a limited number of 
customers means a court will be more likely to impose a post-sale duty to warn on 
a small manufacturer. 
A large manufacturer, on the other hand, is unlikely to have systematic 
continuing contact with its customers. When the number of customers is large, 
systematic continuing contact is more difficult. The lack of continuing contact with 
customers makes it less likely that a large manufacturer would owe a factually 
dependent post-sale duty to warn. It is possible that a large manufacturer may have 
some continuing contact; for example, a customer may contact the manufacturer, 
as was the case in Dixon. But that is likely the exception. 
 
B.  Third Restatement Factors 
 
The Third Restatement states that the duty should exist only “if a reasonable 
person in the seller’s position would provide such a warning.”86 The Third 
Restatement also dictates four factors to determine whether a reasonable person 
would have provided such a warning: 
 
1. the seller knows or reasonably should know that the product poses a 
substantial risk of harm to persons or property; and 
2. those to whom a warning might be provided can be identified and can 
reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the risk of harm; and 
3. a warning can be effectively communicated to and acted on by those to 
whom a warning might be provided; and 
4. the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden of providing 
a warning.87  
 
                                                     
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 924. 
86 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10(a). 
87 Id. § 10(b). For a duty to exist, the plaintiff must establish each of these elements. 
See id. § 10 reporters’ note cmt. a; see also Twerski, supra note 29, at 20.  
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As was also true of the facts that courts evaluated to determine if a post-sale 
duty to warn should exist, application of the Third Restatement’s factors will often 
lead to a small manufacturer owing a post-sale duty to warn, but not a large 
manufacturer. 
 
1.  Knowledge of the Substantial Risk  
 
The first Third Restatement factor clarifies that a warning will only potentially 
be legally required if “the seller knows or reasonably should know that the product 
poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or property.”88 This requirement ensures 
that a manufacturer can be liable only if it is at fault—if it knew or should have 
known about the danger. 
This factor likely applies neutrally to manufacturers regardless of their size. 
Whether large or small, a manufacturer may become aware, or should have 
become aware, of a danger presented by its product. If anything, this factor may be 
present more often for large manufacturers than for small ones. Generally 
speaking, large manufacturers may have more resources for research and 
development, meaning they may be more likely to discover dangers. Large 
manufacturers are also likely to have more customers, increasing the chances that 
someone might be injured and complain to the manufacturer. At the same time, a 
customer may be more likely to complain of injury to a small manufacturer than to 
a large manufacturer because the small manufacturer may be more likely to 
respond.  
Regardless, this factor, imposing a duty only if a manufacturer is aware or 
should be aware of a danger, likely applies neutrally to all manufacturers 
regardless of their size. It is, however, only one of four factors. 
 
2.  Ability to Identify Those Needing a Warning  
 
The second factor requires a warning only if those needing a warning “can be 
identified.”89 Identifying those users can be difficult. As an example, if a vacuum 
manufacturer “manufactured and distributed vacuum cleaners commercially to 
millions of consumers over the course of many years”90 and if the retailers that 
                                                     
88 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10(b)(1). 
89 Id. § 10(b)(2). Federal agencies require some industries to track purchases to 
facilitate government-ordered recalls. The Consumer Protection Safety Commission 
requires manufacturers of “durable infant or toddler product[s]” to include a registration 
card with the product and then maintain a record of any returned cards. 16 C.F.R. 
§§ 1130.3, 1130.8(a) (2014). This enables communication with users to “improve the 
effectiveness of recalls of, and safety alerts regarding, such products.” § 1130.1(a). The 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration also requires that manufacturers of child 
car seats include a registration card. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 588.4–.5 (2013). Again, the express 
purpose of this requirement is “to aid manufacturers in contacting the owners of child 
restraints.” § 588.2. 
90 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. e, illus. 2. 
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sold the vacuum cleaners have “[o]nly scanty and incomplete sales records,”91 the 
lack of records would weigh against imposing a post-sale duty to warn on the 
vacuum manufacturer. In fact, “when no such records are available, the seller’s 
inability to identify those for whom warnings would be useful may properly 
prevent a post-sale duty to warn from arising.”92  
The inability to identify the user precluded the existence of a duty in Lewis v. 
Ariens Co.93 There, the plaintiff had purchased a snow blower from a friend’s 
sister about sixteen years after it was originally sold,94 making the plaintiff difficult 
to identify. The court described the plaintiff as a “member of a universe too diffuse 
and too large for manufacturers or sellers of original equipment to identify,” 
thereby negating a post-sale duty to warn.95 
Russell v. Wright96 illustrates the opposite situation. There, the manufacturer 
of a taser gun operated a certification program to be used in training police officers 
and regularly updated those training materials.97 The manufacturer’s relationship 
with the police department enabled it to inform purchasers of any new warnings or 
information.98 The court explained that this manufacturer was “in a much better 
position than most manufacturers to ensure that users of its product are kept up to 
date on new warnings and instructions,” weighing in favor of imposing a post-sale 
duty to warn.99 
Small manufacturers can likely identify those needing a warning more easily 
than large manufacturers. Naturally, a small manufacturer is likely to sell fewer 
products and have fewer customers than a larger business.100 The fewer the 
customers, the more likely it is the manufacturer will have some continuing contact 
with its customers, perhaps through continuing maintenance and support services 
like in Russell. Even if contact does not continue, the fewer the customers, the 
more likely it is the manufacturer might have maintained some purchasing records. 
But even without records, the fewer the customers, the easier it will be for the 
manufacturer to identify the customers. In Jones v. Bowie Industries, Inc.,101 the 
Supreme Court of Alaska found that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s 
finding of liability for failing to warn after the sale partly because of the relative 
                                                     
91 Id. 
92 Id. § 10 cmt. e. 
93 751 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. 2001). 
94 Id. at 863. 
95 Id. at 867 (quoting Lewis v. Ariens Co., 729 N.E.2d 323, 327 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2000)). 
96 916 F. Supp. 2d 629 (W.D. Va. 2013). 
97 Id. at 651. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 See Ross, supra note 15, at 348 (explaining that the ability to identify those 
needing to be warned will depend on numerous factors, including “the number of units 
sold”). 
101 282 P.3d 316 (Alaska 2012). 
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ease of identifying customers.102 The defendant had “produced relatively few 
hydromulchers like the one that injured [the plaintiff], making identification of the 
class of ultimate users less burdensome.”103  
Even if a small manufacturer does not have continuing contact, records, or 
other means of identifying customers, a small manufacturer is likely to have a 
more “geographically limited market.”104 The Third Restatement explains that 
“[i]ndividual names and addresses are not necessarily required,” but identification 
of a class of product users or “geographically limited markets” may satisfy this 
factor.105 This identification would enable some sort of public notice.106 Thus, even 
when a small manufacturer cannot identify individual customers despite the limited 
amount of products sold, it will likely be able to identify a specific geographical 
area, which weighs in favor of imposing a post-sale duty to warn. 
None of this is true for large manufacturers. Larger manufacturers are less 
likely to have any continuing contact with customers. A larger manufacturer is also 
unlikely to maintain customer records simply because of the cost.107 Why incur 
what could be a very expensive cost when not legally obligated to do so? The 
larger the amount of customers, the more expensive the costs may be because of 
the greater volume of purchases to be tracked. A large manufacturer is also likely 
to sell to a non-limited market, meaning it would be unable to identify a 
                                                     
102 Id. at 335–36. 
103 Id. at 336; see also Jarrett v. Duro-Med Indus., No. 05-102-JBC, 2007 WL 
628146, at *5 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (finding that the customer needing a warning was easily 
identifiable because the defendant was aware that the plaintiff’s specific wheelchair lacked 
a working right wheel brake, but it did not warn the plaintiff of the resulting danger). 
Additionally, in Lovick v. Wil-Rich, the defendant had manufactured approximately 
35,000 cultivators since it first introduced the cultivator into the market in 1971. 588 
N.W.2d 688, 692 (Iowa 1999). Beginning in 1988, the defendant began including a more 
specific warning label of the dangers of operating the cultivator. Id. The Iowa Supreme 
Court adopted the factors enumerated in the Third Restatement to determine if a post-sale 
duty to warn existed for individuals who purchased the cultivator before 1988 and 
remanded the case, so the trial court could instruct the jury regarding those four factors. Id. 
at 695–96.  
104 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. e. 
105 Id. 
106 Madden, supra note 24, at 47. 
107 Regardless of the size of the manufacturer, “in the case of consumer goods, it is 
unlikely that retailers will maintain detailed sales records allowing the identification of 
purchasers or users.” Tom Stilwell, Warning: You May Possess Continuing Duties After the 
Sale of Your Product!, 26 REV. LITIG. 1035, 1055 (2007); see also Ross, supra note 15, at 
348–49 (“Establishing a ‘traceability’ system before the product is sold is the most 
effective way to find customers. However, such systems take planning, considerable effort, 
and substantial cost.”). Presumably, this is even truer when those detailed sales records 
would need to be extensive (and thus expensive) because of the volume of customers. Of 
course, more and more purchases of goods are made online. Because these purchases 
necessarily do not involve cash, some record of the purchase will exist. These records may 
make personal communication more feasible, even with a high volume of customers. 
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geographically limited market in which it sells. This inability to identify customers 
“may properly prevent a post-sale duty to warn from arising.”108  
 
3.  The Ability to Effectively Communicate a Warning 
 
The Third Restatement’s third factor asks whether “a warning can be 
effectively communicated to and acted on by those to whom a warning might be 
provided.”109 Comment g explains that if records exist identifying the consumers, 
“direct communication of a warning may be feasible.”110  
In Jones, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, allowing the jury to decide 
liability for a post-sale failure to warn partially because the manufacturer could 
have effectively communicated the warning.111 Not only was identification of users 
not particularly burdensome because of the relatively few hydromulchers sold, but 
the hydromulcher was also a “specialized machine[] with a limited population of 
users, so that advertisements in trade publications were another viable method 
of . . . warning.”112 Similarly, in Jarrett v. Duro-Med Industries,113 the defendant 
had direct contact with the plaintiff because the plaintiff brought her wheelchair to 
the defendant “to request a replacement right wheel brake.”114 This face-to-face 
contact provided an opportunity for an effectively communicated warning.115 
Direct communication is only feasible if the users or consumers are 
identifiable,116 which is more likely to be true for small manufacturers. This also 
means that small manufacturers will likely be able to warn in the most effective 
way—direct communication—meaning this factor will likely always weigh in 
favor of liability for a small manufacturer that failed to warn. 
Large manufacturers are less likely to be able to warn directly because of the 
inability to identify their customers. They may have some records based on 
customer loyalty programs, but records of only customers’ email addresses allows 
for communication only via email. Even though this is a form of direct 
communication, it is arguably ineffective given users likely ignore spam-like 
emails. It is more likely that large manufacturers will not have any ability to 
identify their many customers, precluding direct communication. In this case, the 
Third Restatement explains that “it may be necessary to utilize the public media to 
                                                     
108 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. e; see also Madden, supra note 24, 
at 47 (explaining that for some products, “price, perishability, limited useful life, or the 
availability of such products through typical over-the-counter markets which 
characteristically do not involve recording the purchasers’ name, will militate against 
finding a post-sale duty to warn individual product users or consumers”). 
109 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10(b)(3). 
110 Id. § 10 cmt. g. 
111 See Jones v. Bowie Indus., Inc., 282 P.3d 316, 336 (Alaska 2012). 
112 Id. 
113 No. 05-102-JBC, 2007 WL 628146 (E.D. Ky. 2007). 
114 Id. at *1. 
115 Id. at *5. 
116 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. g. 
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disseminate information regarding risks of substantial harm.”117 Thus, a large 
manufacturer may have to issue some sort of broad public notice through the 
public media.  
The Third Restatement cautions, however, that it may not require this type of 
broad mass warning. Specifically, it notes that as the amount of those needing to be 
warned increases, the “costs of communicating warnings may increase and their 
effectiveness may decrease.”118 This language suggests a large manufacturer may 
not be required to issue a mass warning. Indeed, why should the law require a large 
manufacturer to incur the great expense of a mass warning when the warning is 
unlikely to be effective anyway? The Third Restatement’s highlighting of the cost 
and ineffectiveness of a mass notice—the only type of notice a large manufacturer 
could even do—indicates the large manufacturer would not be obligated to issue 
such a notice. 
 
4.  The Scale of the Harm and the Cost of the Warning  
 
The last Third Restatement factor is whether the “risk of harm is sufficiently 
great to justify the burden of providing a warning.”119 This factor instructs courts 
to look to the burden of providing a warning, i.e., the costs of the warning. “In the 
post-sale context, identifying those who should receive a warning and 
communicating the warning to them can require large expenditures.”120 Because of 
the cost, even if a substantial risk exists, there may be no duty to warn.121  
This factor seems neutral in application to small and large manufacturers. 
Regardless of the size of the business, a warning is legally required only if the risk 
of harm justifies the costs of that warning. But this factor does not apply neutrally 
because of the relevance of costs. The costs for small and large manufacturers will 
not be the same. The cost of a warning would be less expensive for the small 
manufacturer because of the amount and the geographical limitations of the small 
manufacturer’s customers. The smaller expense to warn customers will always 
weigh in favor of a post-sale duty to warn existing for a small manufacturer. 
The Third Restatement’s post-sale duty to warn is based in negligence, and 
“[w]hat is reasonably prudent post-sale conduct for one manufacturer and one type 
of product may not be reasonable for another manufacturer of an entirely different 
type of product.”122 Suppose the product danger is the same for two manufacturers. 
The first manufacturer’s costs, however, may be so large (because of the number 
of customers to contact) that issuing a post-sale warning is unreasonable and thus 
not required. The second manufacturer’s costs to warn may be reasonable simply 
because there are fewer customers to warn. If the costs are reasonable, then a 
warning is required. The hypothetical holds true even if the product and the 
                                                     
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. § 10(b)(4). 
120 Id. § 10 cmt. i. 
121 Id. 
122 Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1314 (Kan. 1993). 
2014] POST-SALE DUTY TO WARN 1035 
materialized danger are exactly the same. But because of the different costs of a 
post-sale warning, the small manufacturer with fewer customers would owe a duty 
and the large manufacturer would not. 
There is some possibility that a large manufacturer may still owe a duty even 
when its costs of warning are high. That is because the size of the harm depends on 
both the frequency of the harm and its expected severity.123 Because of the amount 
of customers, harm to the customers of a large manufacturer will occur more 
frequently. Three out of six customers of a small manufacturer may be hurt, 
whereas three million out of six million customers of a large manufacturer may be 
hurt. The level of harm for three million customers will likely be substantial. If the 
analysis were a simple benefits of warning (protecting three million consumers) 
versus costs of warning (again all six million consumers), the large manufacturer 
would likely owe a duty to warn despite the costs. 
However, the Third Restatement does not create this simple weighing of the 
benefits versus costs analysis. Instead, it also mandates consideration of the 
effectiveness of the warning.124 Practically, identifying all six million customers is 
likely impossible. The only way to warn those six million customers would be 
through some sort of mass warning. But a mass warning is unlikely to be 
effective.125 Even if the harm is substantial because of its frequency, due to the 
volume of customers, both the costs and the likely ineffectiveness still weigh 
against the post-sale warning obligation. Thus, even though the frequency of injury 
is likely to be high for a large manufacturer because of the volume of its 
customers, this does not mean the large manufacturer will owe a duty to warn. To 
the contrary, the harm is only one factor that courts weigh against both the 
extensive costs and the likely ineffectiveness of communication, both of which will 
weigh against imposing a post-sale warning obligation on larger manufacturers. 
For the small manufacturer, though, the harm is a factor weighed against less 
extensive costs and the likely effectiveness of direct communication, all of which 
will weigh in favor of imposing a post-sale warning obligation.  
Returning to the relevance of costs, the Third Restatement does not instruct 
courts to look at the costs of warning relative to the specific defendant’s finances. 
If this were true, then even though a large manufacturer’s costs to warn were large, 
they may not look so large in relation to the large manufacturer’s overall financial 
situation. Similarly, a small manufacturer’s costs to warn may be less expensive, 
but they still may be excessive when compared to the small manufacturer’s overall 
                                                     
123 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. d (explaining that there would be no 
duty to warn of dangers that “occur infrequently and are not likely to cause substantial 
harm”); see also Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401, 409 (N.D. 
1994) (describing that a large volume of products sold also “suggests that manufacturers 
cannot totally ignore post-sale information which has the potential to prevent serious injury 
to so many people”). 
124 See supra Part III.B.2. 
125 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. g (“As the group to whom warnings 
might be provided increases in size, costs of communicating warnings may increase and 
their effectiveness may decrease.”). 
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financial situation and capability. Despite this disparity, nothing in the Third 
Restatement suggests this type of particularized evaluation of the costs.126  
In any case, such an evaluation of the specific defendant’s finances would not 
be consistent with negligence law generally.127 “Unreasonable conduct is merely 
the failure to take precautions that would generate greater benefits in avoiding 
accidents than the precautions would cost.”128 Accordingly, if the costs of injury 
outweigh the costs of the precaution,129 then the reasonable actor would have 
undertaken that necessary precaution. But if the costs of the precaution outweigh 
the costs of injury, then the precaution is unnecessary and a reasonable actor would 
not take it,130 even if he could personally afford it. Moreover, the law should not be 
that a manufacturer is obligated to undertake unnecessary precautions simply 
because it could afford it.131 This would hurt society as it could cause 
manufacturers to “undesirably curtail their activities . . . [and] set prices above the 
proper level, chilling consumption of their products.”132 Such a law could also be 
potentially unfair as it would “effectively impose[] a tax on corporate size and 
success, thereby discouraging growth and development.”133 Lastly, if abundant 
financial resources were a reason to impose liability, would insufficient financial 
resources be a reason to negate liability? Surely, this is not a desirable result.  
Thus, for valid reasons, the Third Restatement does not contemplate 
evaluation of the specific defendant’s financial resources. Instead, the costs are 
evaluated without any context—meaning a large manufacturer’s costs likely will 
be high, negating the likelihood of post-sale warning liability, and a small 
manufacturer’s costs likely will be low, increasing the likelihood of post-sale 
warning liability. 
 
                                                     
126 The Third Restatement instead explains that identifying users and communicating 
the warning “can require large expenditures,” and thus the obligation to warn after sale 
should exist “only if the risk of harm is sufficiently great.” Id. § 10 cmt. i. 
127 Id. (explaining that the “test defining unreasonable conduct is that which governs 
negligence generally”). 
128 McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1987). 
129 See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(introducing an analytical formula for determining reasonable conduct: weighing the 
probability and severity of injury versus the burden of adequate precaution). 
130 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 879 (1998) (defining a “socially excessive precaution” as a 
precaution “that costs more than the reduction of harm produced by it”). 
131 Id. at 911. This also raises questions of how the jury would determine whether a 
defendant could “afford” a post-sale warning. Is it that the defendant’s business was 
profitable overall that year? Or is it that the defendant has excess cash at the time it should 
have warned? 
132 Id. 
133 Id.; see also id. at 912 (explaining that “retarding the natural growth of 
corporations can have adverse consequences, notably, that society forgoes economies of 
scale in production and in research and development”). 
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IV.  THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH A RULE THAT 
(UNINTENTIONALLY) TARGETS SMALL MANUFACTURERS 
 
A law that is more likely to create liability for small manufacturers than for 
large manufacturers is problematic. It is inconsistent with the theories underlying 
products liability law.134 The factually dependent duty is also inconsistent with 
general public policy because of its potentially devastating consequences for small 
manufacturers, the same manufacturers already most vulnerable to the effects of 
products liability. Ironically, a factually dependent duty is also most likely to apply 
to this most vulnerable manufacturer.  
 
A.  Inconsistent with the Underlying Theories of Products Liability 
 
Various theories underlie the imposition of liability on manufacturers when 
their products injure people. The theories include (1) fairness, (2) the 
manufacturer’s superior position, (3) self-determination, (4) deterrence, and (5) 
risk spreading. None of these theories support a factually dependent post-sale duty 
because of its delineation between manufacturers that have to warn and those that 
do not. All of these theories, however, likely support the imposition of a broad 
post-sale duty to warn owed by all manufacturers regardless of the costs of the 
warning.  
 
1.  Fairness 
 
“This idea of fairness embodies the maxim that those who design, market, and 
profit from a product should also pay for the injuries it causes.”135 The idea of 
                                                     
134 Technically, the theories of products liability explored in this section are the 
theories behind imposing strict liability for defective products that injure plaintiffs. There 
has been gradual movement away from strict liability for defective products. See e.g., 
David A. Logan, When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The Curious Case of the 
“Flagrant Trespasser,” 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1448, 1459–60 (2011). If the product is 
defective because of a manufacturing defect, liability is still strict. If the product is 
defective because of its design and the jurisdiction uses the consumer expectations test, 
liability is also strict. But if the product is defective because of an inadequate warning, 
liability is based in negligence in all jurisdictions. See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying 
text. Similarly, if the product is defective in its design, liability is essentially based in 
negligence if the court follows the risk-utility test. See supra note 15. Any liability for a 
post-sale failure to warn is similarly based in negligence—a manufacturer failing to warn 
about a later-materialized danger about which it knew or should have known. These 
theories, although originally invoked to adopt strict liability, can still support negligence-
based liability for injuries caused by defective products. 
135 Ellen Wertheimer, The Third Restatement of Torts: An Unreasonably Dangerous 
Doctrine, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1235, 1235 (1994); see also Brooks v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 58 (N.M. 1995) (“The burden of illness from dangerous products . . . 
should be placed upon those who profit from its production . . . .” (quoting Beshada v. 
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982)).  
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fairness also includes the evaluation of who should bear the costs of the injury, 
whether it is the manufacturer or the injured consumer. The manufacturer is 
responsible for the injury and should pay the resultant damages.136 California 
Supreme Court Justice Traynor long ago pointed to fairness as a reason for making 
manufacturers liable: “The purpose of . . . liability is to insure that the costs of 
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put 
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless 
to protect themselves.”137  
The fairness theory supports the imposition of a broad post-sale duty to warn 
on all manufacturers. The manufacturer puts the product on the market and profits 
from doing so. So, the costs of injuries caused by later-materialized dangers of the 
product should be borne by the manufacturer who placed the dangerous product on 
the market. A New Jersey court recognized this fairness rationale when adopting a 
post-sale duty to warn in Dixon v. Jacobsen Manufacturing Co., explaining that the 
“imposition of a duty on the manufacturer to warn of dangers after a product is 
manufactured, and the extent of that duty, is essentially rooted in concepts of 
fairness.”138  
Between the manufacturer and the injured user, courts should force the 
manufacturer to cover the costs of the injury resulting from the manufacturer’s 
failure to issue a post-sale warning. True, the risk was possibly unknowable at the 
time of manufacture. But by the time a manufacturer may need to issue a post-sale 
warning, the danger is known (or should have been known). If a manufacturer fails 
to warn of such a danger, the manufacturer is liable. This is liability based on fault; 
a reasonable manufacturer would have warned and this defendant is liable for a 
failure to act like that reasonable manufacturer. Fairness dictates that between a 
manufacturer who is at fault and an injured user, the manufacturer should be forced 
to cover the costs of the user’s injury.  
Even though fairness supports the imposition of a broad post-sale duty to 
warn, it does not support the factually dependent version developed in early case 
law and the Third Restatement because of its consideration of costs. At first glance, 
it would seem fair to consider the defendant’s costs in determining liability for 
failing to issue a post-sale warning. But the fairness theory dictates “that the 
burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be 
placed upon those who market” the product.139 Thus, those who placed the product 
on the market should be liable regardless of the costs of warning.  
                                                     
136 Wertheimer, supra note 135, at 1238–39 (“[I]f neither the manufacturer nor the 
consumer is an appropriate cost-avoider, then the entity who placed the product on the 
market and profited from its sales should pay.”); see also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 
150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (“If such products nevertheless 
find their way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for 
whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in 
the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market.”). 
137 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). 
138 637 A.2d 915, 923 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
139 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965). 
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Similarly, the factually dependent post-sale duty is also inconsistent with the 
fairness theory because of how it distinguishes between manufacturers. If the costs 
of issuing a post-sale warning are too great, which will often be true for large 
manufacturers, that manufacturer will not be liable because a reasonable 
manufacturer would not have issued a warning. But if the costs are reasonable, 
which will often be true for small manufacturers, the manufacturer will be liable. 
The fairness theory, however, would not recognize distinctions based on what 
types of manufacturers should be liable and which should not, especially any 
distinction based on costs. Costly warnings or not, the manufacturer put the 
dangerous product on the market and should have to pay for the injuries the 
product caused.  
Lastly, the factually dependent post-sale duty is inconsistent with the fairness 
theory because of how it distinguishes between consumers. The factually 
dependent duty distinguishes between consumers who are limited to a small 
geographic market (who would be entitled to a warning under a factually 
dependent post-sale duty to warn) and consumers who are dispersed nationwide 
(who would not be entitled to such a warning). The fairness theory, however, 
dictates that “the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of 
protection” from “those who market the products.”140 All consumers deserve this 
maximum protection, not just some. Thus, fairness supports the imposition of a 
broad post-sale duty to warn where all consumers would be warned regardless of 
the costs. 
 
2.  Manufacturer Is in a Superior Position to Discover Dangers 
 
Another principle underlying products liability that is somewhat similar to 
fairness is the manufacturer’s superior ability to discover dangers. Just as the 
manufacturer put the dangerous product on the market, the manufacturer is in the 
best position to eliminate those dangers. As Justice Traynor explained in Escola v. 
Coca Cola Bottling Co.,141 “[i]t is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate 
some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot. 
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its 
consequences.”142 The manufacturer has this superior position because of “the 
processes of design, testing, inspection and collection of data on product safety 
                                                     
140 Id. 
141 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
142 Id. at 440–41 (Traynor, J., concurring); see also id. at 443 (“The consumer no 
longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product, 
even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been 
lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and 
marketing such devices as trade-marks.”). Justice Traynor used this language to advocate 
for strict liability. However, it also supports negligence-based liability. 
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performance in the field.”143 Imposing liability should motivate manufacturers “to 
use this information to help combat the massive problem of product accidents.”144  
This principle supports the imposition of a post-sale duty to warn for all 
manufacturers regardless of costs. In the post-sale scenario, the manufacturer is in 
a superior position to discover dangers from its product. People hurt by products 
will often complain to the manufacturer145 and may even sue the manufacturer. 
Through either form of notification, the manufacturer could discover dangers in its 
product, including dangers about which it did not know pre-sale. Related to these 
complaints or not, the manufacturer may also continue to research and develop its 
products even after sale. Again, through this research, the manufacturer could 
discover dangers in its product. 
An individual user does not have access to this type of information. He has no 
idea whether others have been harmed by the manufacturer’s product. He also has 
no idea what additional research has shown regarding the dangers of the product. 
The discrepancy between the manufacturer’s knowledge and the consumer’s 
knowledge may even be greater post-sale than it is pre-sale. 
Some courts have relied on the manufacturer’s superior position in adopting a 
post-sale duty to warn. Specifically, the New York Court of Appeals stated:  
 
The justification for the post-sale duty to warn arises from a 
manufacturer’s unique (and superior) position to follow the use and 
adaptation of its product by consumers. Compared to purchasers and 
users of a product, a manufacturer is best placed to learn about post-sale 
defects or dangers discovered in use.146  
 
Alaska courts have cited this language,147 and Iowa courts have also pointed to this 
justification as the reason for a post-sale duty.148 These courts are correct. The 
manufacturer has superior knowledge of dangers accompanying its products that 
emerge only after sale. Imposing a post-sale duty to warn would force 
manufacturers to share this information and help combat product accidents.  
                                                     
143 David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. 
REV. 1258, 1258 (1976). 
144 Id.; see also Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 207–08 (N.Y. 
1983) (“A manufacturer is held liable regardless of his lack of actual knowledge of the 
condition of the product because he is in the superior position to discover any design 
defects and alter the design before making the product available to the public.”). 
145 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. c (“As a practical matter, most post-
sale duties to warn arise when new information is brought to the attention of the seller, 
after the time of sale, concerning risks accompanying the product’s use or consumption.”). 
146 Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 700 N.E.2d 303, 307 (N.Y. 1998) (citation omitted). 
147 Jones v. Bowie Indus., Inc., 282 P.3d 316, 334–35 & n.65 (Alaska 2012). 
148 Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Iowa 1999) (explaining that warning 
obligations “reduce the chance of injury by equalizing the asymmetry of information 
between the parties”). 
2014] POST-SALE DUTY TO WARN 1041 
Even though a manufacturer’s superior position supports a post-sale duty to 
warn, it does not support the factually dependent version that courts have adopted 
and that is included in the Third Restatement. This is because the factually 
dependent version of the post-sale duty to warn will obligate some, but not others, 
to warn based on the costs of the warning. Regardless of those costs, the 
manufacturer is in a superior position, relative to the consumer, to discover dangers 
post sale. Also, the manufacturers most likely to have an obligation to warn will be 
small manufacturers, even though large manufacturers may be in an even more 
superior position to discover dangers.149 Regardless of its size, the manufacturer is 
in a superior position, relative to the consumer, to discover dangers post sale. All 
manufacturers should thus be obligated to warn of dangers materializing after sale. 
Plus, a distinction between manufacturers based on the costs of 
communicating the warning to consumers makes little sense in light of this 
purpose. Those that can communicate easily, most likely smaller manufacturers, 
are obligated; those who cannot communicate easily, most likely larger 
manufacturers, are not obligated despite their superior knowledge. Regardless of 
the ease of communicating, all manufacturers are in a superior position to discover 
dangers relative to consumers. 
 
3.  Individual Autonomy/Self-Determination 
 
Liability for a point-of-sale failure to warn is also supported by another 
theoretical justification that is specific only to warning defects—educating users 
about the risks of the product enables the user to determine whether to purchase the 
product. This theory supports a broad post-sale duty to warn, but not a factually 
dependent one that would obligate some manufacturers but not others. 
 
(a)  Self-Determination Versus Minimizing Injury 
 
Warnings can serve two purposes. “First, warnings may reduce the risk of 
product-related injury by allowing consumers to behave more carefully than if they 
remained ignorant of risks associated with product use.”150 The second purpose is 
different; it does not simply allow consumers to act more carefully. Instead, 
warnings provide consumers “the information necessary to choose whether or not 
they wish to encounter certain kinds of risks on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.”151  
                                                     
149 See infra Part IV.B. 
150 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 13, at 285. 
151 Id. The Third Restatement also recognizes these two purposes: “Warnings alert 
users and consumers to the existence and nature of product risks so that they can prevent 
harm either by appropriate conduct during use or consumption or by choosing not to use or 
consume.” THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 2 cmt. i. Professors James A. Henderson, 
Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski label this purpose of warnings as the “social utility” purpose. See 
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability 
Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1318 (1991). 
This purpose requires warnings that will “reduce the risk of product-related injury by 
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This second purpose promotes individual autonomy.152 By fully informing a 
user of the dangers of a product, the user is able to make a cost-benefit decision on 
whether to purchase the product. “[T]his kind of informed consent value focuses 
on protecting a user’s individual rights—specifically, the user’s right of self-
determination, the right to ‘determine his own fate.’”153 An adequate warning is 
required because “the user or consumer is entitled to make his own choice as to 
whether the product’s utility or benefits justify exposing himself to the risk of 
harm.”154  
This self-determination basis for imposing a duty to warn mirrors an informed 
consent medical malpractice case. This type of medical malpractice case does not 
question whether the doctor did the proper surgery or adequately performed that 
surgery. Instead, the focus is on whether the doctor properly disclosed the risks of 
that surgery to the patient. Proper disclosure is necessary to provide the patient 
with “adequate information” to enable him to decide “whether he wishes to 
encounter the risk[s]” associated with treatment.155 Many states use a standard to 
determine the required contents of the disclosure based on what a reasonable 
patient would want to know.156 
                                                     
allowing consumers to behave more carefully.” Henderson & Twerski, supra note 13, at 
285. The self-determination purpose, on the other hand, enables users to determine whether 
the utility of the product justifies encountering the risks. This purpose “reflects fairness 
concerns more clearly than the risk-reduction efforts.” Id. 
152 OWEN, supra note 5, § 9.1, at 585; see also OWEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 9.1, at 
513–14 (“The latter rationale—informed consent—reflects the societal judgment that a 
product user or consumer is entitled to make his own choice as to whether the product’s 
utility or benefits justify exposing himself or others to the risk of harm.”); Henderson & 
Twerski, supra note 13, at 285 (explaining that the self-determination purpose obligates 
warnings that “provide consumers with the information necessary to choose whether or not 
they wish to encounter certain kinds of risks on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis”); THIRD 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 2 cmt. i (“[W]arnings allow the user or consumer to avoid 
the risk warned against by making an informed decision not to purchase or use the product 
at all and hence not encounter the risk.”). 
153 OWEN, supra note 5, § 9.1, at 585 (citing Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 
727 F.2d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984)). The Fifth Circuit describes self-determination as one of 
the principles underlying strict liability for failure to warn. Pavlides, 727 F.2d at 338. The 
other principle underlying strict liability for failure to warn is “social utility” in that “a 
warning that costs the manufacturer little can prevent severe losses by enabling users to 
avert harm.” Id. 
154 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973); see 
also Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A] warning can do more 
than exhort its audience to be careful. It can also affect what activities the people warned 
choose to engage in.”). 
155 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 13, at 286. 
156 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786–87 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (requiring 
disclosure of “all risks potentially affecting the [patient’s] decision”); Largey v. Rothman, 
540 A.2d 504, 508 (N.J. 1988) (requiring a physician to disclose risks that “a reasonable 
patient . . . would be likely to attach significance to” (quoting Cantebury v. Spence, 464 
F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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(b)  Supporting a Post-Sale Duty to Warn Owed by All Manufacturers 
 
The self-determination purpose of warnings supports the imposition of a post-
sale duty to warn, enabling the user to continue to make informed decisions 
regarding product use. When the user first uses a sausage-stuffing machine, a 
warning enables him to make the informed decision whether to use it. Every time 
the user uses the machine, he continually needs to make an informed decision. If a 
danger is discovered six months after he first uses it without being informed of that 
danger, the user is prevented from making an informed decision whether to 
continue to use the machine.  
Granted, this possible later decision to cease use differs from the initial 
decision to use. At the initial decision, the user may decide not to purchase the 
product at all because of the foreseeable dangers. At the later decision, the user has 
already invested in the product, creating the natural tendency to want to continue 
use; a decision to cease use would create an additional loss based on the value of 
the machine at that point. The user needs to be able to balance the foreseeable 
dangers of continued use against this natural tendency to avoid the loss.157  
Whether at the initial or later decision, however, the self-determination 
purpose aims to ensure the decision belongs to the user—the user can decide if the 
product’s benefits outweigh its costs (the foreseeable dangers and out-of-pocket 
losses based on the then-existing value of the product). Without full disclosure of 
the substantial dangers, including the dangers that arise only years after purchase, 
this cost-benefit decision is transferred back from the user to the manufacturer.  
The Eleventh Circuit alluded to the self-determination purpose in the context 
of post-sale warnings in Watkins v. Ford Motor Co.158 There, the defendant’s 
expert testified that once the consumer decided to drive the car at issue, “no 
warning could guard against the dangers of rollover.”159 The court explained, 
however, that the purpose of a warning, a point-of-sale or a post-sale warning, is 
not necessarily to prevent an accident.160 Instead, warnings are required to allow 
the user “to make an informed decision whether to take on the risks warned of.”161 
Once the defendant discovers the risk of a rollover, it must warn the user of that 
                                                     
157 Even if some users choose to continue using the product to avoid the loss, it does 
not negate the need to warn under the self-determination purpose. See THIRD 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 2, cmt. i (“Whether or not many persons would, when 
warned, nonetheless decide to use or consume the product, warnings are required to protect 
the interests of those reasonably foreseeable users or consumers who would, based on their 
own reasonable assessments of the risks and benefits, decline product use or 
consumption.”). 
158 190 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 1999). 
159 Id. at 1219. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
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risk so that the user can make an informed decision whether to continue driving the 
automobile.162  
The self-determination purpose requires warnings “whenever a reasonable 
man would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose 
himself to it.”163 It would require disclosure of any risks that are great enough that 
a reasonable user would want to be informed of them, enabling that reasonable 
user to decide whether the utility of the product justifies exposure to the danger.164 
This purpose requires warnings both at the point of sale165 and at whatever later 
time the manufacturer discovers, or should discover, a substantial danger about 
which a reasonable user would want to know. 
 
(c)  Lack of Support for a Factually Dependent Post-Sale Duty to Warn 
 
The self-determination principle supports obligating manufacturers to warn of 
any post-sale dangers about which a reasonable person would want to know. It 
does not, however, support a factually dependent post-sale duty to warn, mainly 
                                                     
162 See id. at 1219–20. This analysis in Watkins is the closest a court has come to 
invoking self-determination in adopting a post-sale duty to warn. The Fifth Circuit invoked 
self-determination in explaining the reason for a point-of-sale duty to warn under Texas 
law. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973). In 
interpreting whether Texas law included a post-sale duty to warn, however, the Fifth 
Circuit rejected such a duty. See, e.g., McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 
430 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a post-sale duty to warn except in situations where (1) the 
manufacturer voluntarily, but negligently, attempts to provide a warning, or (2) the 
manufacturer regains control of the product after its initial sale and fails to remedy the 
known defect before the subsequent sale); Syrie v. Knoll Int’l, 748 F.2d 304, 311 (5th Cir. 
1984) (describing that there is no cause of action in Texas “for a failure to warn about 
hazards discovered after a product has been manufactured and sold”). 
163 Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089; see also OWEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 9.1, at 514 (“[A] 
‘true choice’ situation arises, and a duty to warn attaches, whenever a reasonable man 
would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose himself to it.”). 
164 Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129–30 (9th Cir. 1968) (“When, in a 
particular case, the risk qualitatively (e.g., of death or major disability) as well as 
quantitatively, on balance with the end sought to be achieved, is such as to call for a true 
choice judgment, medical or personal, the warning must be given.”). 
165 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 2 cmt. i (“[W]arnings must be provided for 
inherent risks that reasonably foreseeable product users and consumers would reasonably 
deem material or significant in deciding whether to use or consume the product.”); see also 
Edwards v. Hop Sin, Inc., 140 S.W.3d 13, 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003) (“A reasonable 
consumer, moreover, expects warnings only against latent risks that are substantial, those 
risks sufficiently likely and sufficiently serious to demand attention. The graver the risk, of 
course, the less likely it need be to be substantial.”). Substantiality is explicitly relevant to 
warnings of potential allergic reactions. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 2 cmt. k 
(stating that “a warning is required when the harm-causing ingredient is one to which a 
substantial number of persons are allergic” and that “[t]he more severe the harm, the more 
justified is a conclusion that the number of persons at risk need not be large to be 
considered ‘substantial’”).  
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because of its consideration of the costs of warning. Regardless of the cost, the 
self-determination principle dictates that the user is entitled to be warned of the 
substantial risks. That is one reason why the costs of a point-of-sale warning are 
not relevant to whether a user is entitled to warning of the substantial risks.166 
Instead, consistent with the self-determination principle, the extent of the danger 
determines whether a warning is required at the point of sale. The factually 
dependent post-sale duty considers the costs, however, dictating that no duty is 
owed if the costs are burdensome. This consideration is inconsistent with the self-
determination principle.  
The consideration of costs also creates a consequence specifically inconsistent 
with the self-determination principle—it creates two categories of users. If the 
costs of warning are low, the manufacturer’s customers are entitled to a warning 
and to determine their own fate. But if the costs of warning are high, the 
manufacturer’s customers are not entitled to a warning or to determine their own 
fate. Applied to the reality of the differing costs for small and large manufacturers, 
the customers of smaller manufacturers will be entitled to decide their own fate, 
but customers of larger manufacturers will not be similarly entitled. The self-
determination principle rejects any idea of some users being entitled to determine 
their own fates, but not others. A customer of a small manufacturer, “no less than 
any other product user, has a right to decide whether to expose himself to the 
risk.”167  
Moreover, the factors that decide who is entitled to notice under a factually 
dependent version of a post-sale duty to warn are irrational. The number of 
products sold and the size of the market bear no relationship to whether those 
customers are especially in need of information. A user of a sausage-stuffing 
machine should be informed about the newly-discovered danger of using the 
machine regardless of whether the manufacturer sells dozens or millions of the 
machines. The self-determination purpose of warnings would not draw any 
distinction based on the user’s entitlement to information, much less a distinction 
based on the number of products sold. 
 
4.  Deterrence 
 
Another principle behind imposing liability for defective products that injure 
plaintiffs is that possible liability should motivate manufacturers to make products 
as safe as practicable.168 Because the product has left the manufacturer’s control, 
                                                     
166 Practically, this is also because the costs are assumed to be negligible. See supra 
notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
167 Borel, 493 F.2d at 1106. 
168 This was a major motivation behind adopting strict liability as opposed to only 
imposing liability for fault (negligence). OWEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 5.4, at 287 
(explaining that “raising the standard of liability for manufacturers from negligence to strict 
liability will improve product safety”); see also First Nat’l Bank v. Nor-Am Agric. Prods., 
Inc., 537 P.2d 682, 695 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (explaining that imposing strict liability “will 
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few ways exist to make a product safer after sale.169 But the manufacturer could 
improve safety by issuing a post-sale warning. 
It is difficult to evaluate a post-sale duty to warn under the deterrence 
rationale. Deterrence was a main motivation for imposing strict liability as opposed 
to a mere negligence standard, and imposing liability regardless of fault creates the 
strongest incentive to force manufacturers to make products as safe as practicable. 
The popularity of strict liability for product defects has diminished, however, and 
most do not advocate a post-sale duty to warn based in strict liability.170 
Even negligence-based liability can create some deterrent effect. Both the 
point-of-sale and proposed post-sale warning obligations are based in negligence, 
meaning a manufacturer can only be liable if at fault. This creates some incentive 
to make products as safe as practicable. A negligence-based post-sale warning 
obligation creates an incentive to issue the warnings only when the costs of the 
warnings are reasonable. If the costs are reasonable, the manufacturers should be 
motivated to issue the warning. But a manufacturer has no incentive to issue the 
warning if the costs are great, regardless of how much safer the warning would 
make the product. If the costs are great, the manufacturer likely would not be 
found liable for not issuing a warning, negating any incentive to make its product 
safer by issuing the warning.  
The point-of-sale warning obligation is also based in negligence, but it creates 
a greater incentive to improve the safety of products than the negligence-based 
post-sale warning obligation. If the manufacturer knows of a danger at the point of 
sale, there is no evaluation of whether to risk not issuing a warning. If a user is hurt 
based on that failure to warn, the manufacturer will be liable. But if the 
manufacturer learns of a danger after sale, the manufacturer can gamble. If a user 
is hurt based on that failure to warn, the manufacturer will not necessarily be liable 
because of the costs.171 The costs of the warning are irrelevant to the point-of-sale 
                                                     
cause manufacturers to take cautionary steps to prevent the marketing of dangerously 
defective products”).  
169 A manufacturer rarely owes a tort-based duty to recall or retrofit a defective 
product. Government agencies, however, may require a recall. Notably, the United States 
Consumer Safety Product Commission does not consider the costs of the recall when 
determining whether to order it. Instead, it considers the “pattern of defect, the number of 
defective products distributed in commerce, and the severity of risk to consumers.” See 
Ross, supra note 15, at 354. 
170 See, e.g., Richmond, supra note 17, at 30–40 (reviewing nine jurisdictions’ 
approaches to a post-sale duty to warn). 
171 Plus, if the manufacturer did issue the warning, it would be voluntarily assuming 
the duty and could face liability if it acted unreasonably within that voluntary warning 
campaign. Many states recognize a duty based on its voluntary assumption. See e.g., 
McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 432 (5th Cir. 2001) (imposing post-sale 
warning liability when the manufacturer is negligent in its voluntary attempt to provide a 
post-sale warning); Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 833 (Minn. 
1988) (explaining that the defendant learned that its products were exploding and 
voluntarily “undertook a duty to warn of K-rim dangers”). This is consistent with general 
tort law that imposes a duty to act reasonably when an actor voluntarily assumes a duty. 
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obligation, but almost control the post-sale obligation. The consideration of costs 
means a factually dependent post-sale duty does not create the incentive for 
product safety that the point-of-sale obligation does, much less the incentive the 
deterrence rationale envisions. 
 
5.  The Manufacturer’s Ability to Spread the Risk 
 
The basic idea of risk spreading is that a manufacturer is better able to cover 
the costs of injuries resulting from defective products because of its ability to 
integrate those costs into the price of the product.172 A broad post-sale duty to warn 
would be consistent with this rationale, but a factually dependent post-sale duty to 
warn would not. 
 
(a)  Explained 
 
California Supreme Court Justice Traynor pointed to this rationale in Escola 
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., explaining “the risk of injury can be insured by the 
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.”173 
Manufacturers can distribute those costs by increasing the price of their goods.174 
The risk of injury is constant, and “[a]gainst such a risk there should be a general 
and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such 
protection.”175  
Former Vanderbilt University Law School Dean John W. Wade also pointed 
to risk spreading in his contributions to the development of strict liability. He 
explained “the manufacturer can more easily obtain appropriate liability insurance 
coverage” to cover the costs of injuries and can “spread [the loss] among all the 
consumers” “by pricing his product.”176 In his influential work on defining a defect 
                                                     
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965) (imposing liability for a failure 
to exercise reasonable care by “[o]ne who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of 
another who is helpless”).  
172 Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Dangerous Products and Injured Bystanders, 81 KY. L.J. 
687, 705–06 (1992–1993); see also Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 823 
(N.J. 1981) (“In time, the risk-spreading and cost avoidance measures adverted to above 
should become a normal part of business planning in connection with the corporate 
acquisition of the assets of a manufacturing enterprise.”). 
173 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
174 See id. 
175 Id.; see also Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. 
L. REV. 917, 952 (1966) (explaining that under the risk-spreading principle, “[t]he 
manufacturer is expected to provide for such liability by either purchasing insurance, or by 
self-insuring through the creation of a reserve for anticipated losses. The insurance 
premium or costs of self-insuring become a manufacturing expense to be passed on to the 
ultimate purchaser by means of a rise in prices.”). 
176 John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 
825, 826 (1973). “A different way of expressing essentially the same idea is to say that the 
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in strict liability, one of the factors Dean Wade delineated was “[t]he feasibility, on 
the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the 
product or carrying liability insurance.”177  
As the popularity of strict liability for defective products has diminished, the 
popularity of the risk-spreading idea underlying strict liability has also diminished. 
Practically, transaction costs preclude the theoretically simple transfer of money 
from the increased prices of products to payments to accident victims. “[F]or each 
dollar that an accident victim receives in a settlement or judgment, it is reasonable 
to assume that a dollar of legal and administrative expenses is incurred.”178 This is 
inefficient and “analogous to a person using an ATM at which a withdrawal of 
$100 results in a service fee of $100.”179 Regardless of this powerful criticism, 
courts still sometimes discuss risk spreading, making it appropriate to evaluate 
whether risk spreading would support the imposition of any post-sale duty to warn. 
 
(b)  Likely Support for a Post-Sale Duty to Warn for All Manufacturers 
 
True, manufacturers generally control the prices of their products and could 
increase those prices to cover costs related to warning of later-knowable potential 
dangers. Thus, it seems that risk spreading supports the imposition of a post-sale 
duty to warn. 
At the same time, the danger is unknowable when the manufacturer prices the 
product, which could make risk spreading difficult. This is another reason why the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Beshada was heavily criticized. Beshada 
held that a manufacturer could be liable for failing to warn of a danger unknowable 
at the time of sale.180 Commentators questioned how a manufacturer could 
incorporate the costs of an unknowable injury into the price of a product: 
 
Even if one agrees that risk spreading is a valid goal, however, it is 
questionable whether the manufacturer or its insurer is capable of 
assessing product risks that are unknowable but nevertheless must be 
underwritten at the time the product is sold. The manufacturer’s liability 
exposure, then, is potentially uninsurable. Since the cost and potential 
loss associated with product risks could not, except on an “open guess 
basis,” be included in the price of the product, the likely result would be 
overpricing or underpricing the cost of insurance and of the product.181 
                                                     
activity of making the particular product should pay its own way, that the enterprise should 
bear the liability.” Id. 
177 Id. at 838. 
178 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1470 (2010). 
179 Id. 
180 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982). 
181 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 903–04; see also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 13, 
at 274–75 (explaining that “manufacturers cannot . . . insure against risks that even 
reasonably careful persons do not know exist” and “[l]iability for unknowable risks is a 
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The same consequence could occur with post-sale duty to warn liability. The 
dangers were unknowable when the product was priced. The cost and potential loss 
associated with that later discovered danger could not have been included in the 
price of the product.182 The manufacturer can do little more than speculate, and 
“the likely result would be overpricing or underpricing the cost of insurance and of 
the product.”183  
There is one difference between liability for a post-sale duty to warn and strict 
liability under Beshada—a post-sale warning obligation applies only to dangers 
about which the manufacturer learns or should learn.184 There is no practical way 
for a manufacturer to avoid liability under Beshada. A manufacturer could, 
however, avoid liability for a failure to issue a post-sale warning. Plainly, a 
manufacturer will not be liable for a post-sale failure to warn if it properly issues 
an adequate warning of the newly discovered danger. 
Still, because of the possible need to issue a post-sale warning, a manufacturer 
may want to build into the price of the product something to cover the costs of 
issuing that post-sale warning.185 Again, this could lead to overpricing the product. 
                                                     
weed that should not be allowed to take root in the failure-to-warn garden”); Wertheimer, 
supra note 135, at 1239 (“[C]ost spreading will not be possible because the costs of the 
injuries are not known in advance, usually where the danger of the product was 
unknowable at the time of sale.”); Ellen Wertheimer, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: A 
Modest Proposal, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189, 197 n.29 (1996) (“The cost-spreading 
rationale, which requires spreading the costs of injuries before those injuries occur, does 
not work particularly well in the context of dangers unknowable at the time of sale because 
it is difficult to insure against an unknowable risk, and impossible to spread the costs of an 
unknowable danger before that danger materializes.”). 
182 See Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for 
Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 878 (1983) (“Since the offending products 
would already have been priced and sold, their liability costs could not be assigned to 
them.”). 
183 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 904. 
184 Still, a post-sale duty to warn may have a similar effect as a Beshada strict liability 
failure to warn claim. A Beshada strict liability failure to warn claim is a way to hold 
manufacturers liable for failing to warn of dangers that were unknowable at the time of 
sale. See Beshada, 447 A.2d at 549. A post-sale duty to warn is also based on those 
unknowable dangers, except it arises at the time when the dangers become knowable (and 
the defendant fails to warn of them). 
185 Even if the manufacturer plans to continue to research its product and to issue any 
warnings that may become necessary, there is no guarantee that actually issuing a warning 
will mean the defendant is not liable—the plaintiff can still allege that the warning given 
was inadequate. See Smith v. Ontario Sewing Mach. Co., 548 S.E.2d 89, 96 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2001) (“A post-sale warning must be adequate and specific to satisfy the manufacturer-
seller’s duty to the ultimate user to protect from harm; a vague or generalized warning that 
fails to warn of the specific defect, the danger from the defect, and remediation is not an 
adequate warning.”), vacated, 576 S.E.2d 38 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). In a recent case pending 
in Alaska, a manufacturer of a facial moisturizer issued a post-sale warning after it 
discovered that its moisturizer may have contained a “very low level of common bacteria.” 
Blake v. Guthy-Renker, LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1079 (D. Alaska 2013). The plaintiff 
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Because of the ability to avoid liability, the same impossibility of risk spreading in 
Beshada does not apply to a post-sale duty to warn. A broad post-sale duty to 
warn, then, is likely consistent with products liability’s underlying risk-spreading 
rationale. 
 
(c)  Lack of Support for a Factually Dependent Post-Sale Duty 
 
A factually dependent post-sale duty is, however, inconsistent with risk 
spreading because it obligates some manufacturers to warn but not others. The 
risk-spreading rationale does not recognize any distinctions among which 
manufacturers should be obligated and which should not. 
Although Dean Wade listed the ability of the manufacturer to spread the risk 
as a factor relevant to whether a defect exists, he did not believe liability should 
depend on whether the particular defendant had the ability to spread the risk.186 In 
fact, Dean Wade did not believe this factor should even be mentioned to the 
jury.187 Courts agree. To imply “defendants should be held liable because they had 
the ability to spread the loss for injuries among all the users of the product by 
setting the price of the product or by carrying liability insurance” is “simply . . . 
not the law.”188 Just as a specific defendant’s ability to spread the risk is not 
relevant, a defendant’s specific inability to spread the risk is not relevant.  
Instead, the risk-spreading rationale ignores the practical differences between 
manufacturers and assumes that all defendants can spread the risk and should be 
liable for injuries resulting from defective products.189 Even small manufacturers 
that lack the practical ability to raise prices because it will hurt their ability to 
compete are assumed to be able to spread the risk.190 Thus, even if the risk-
spreading rationale would support a broad post-sale duty to warn, it would not 
                                                     
alleges, however, that this warning was inadequate and thus the manufacturer breached its 
duty to issue a post-sale warning. Id. at 1079–80. 
186 See Wade, supra note 176, at 837–838, 840. 
187 Id. at 840. 
188 Fiorino v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 707 A.2d 1053, 1057 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1998). 
189 See Note, supra note 175, at 952 (distinguishing risk spreading from “a loss-
bearing or ‘deep-pocket’ justification which would make liability dependent upon whether 
the manufacturer or injured purchaser can better afford the loss”). 
190 Courts have considered the inability to spread the risk when declining to adopt 
successor liability. See Malloy v. Doty Conveyor, 820 F. Supp. 217, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1993) 
(declining to find an installer company strictly liable because it was not within the chain of 
distribution and was thus unable to “control the defect and spread its costs through 
pricing”); Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1111 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (finding it problematic whether successors, especially small 
entrepreneurs, can spread the costs); Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 958 A.2d 498, 506 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2008) (finding that successors can be liable if it is shown that the successor had 
the “ability to assume the original manufacturer’s risk-spreading role [sic]” (quoting 
Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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support a particularized factual version that would obligate some manufacturers 
but not others depending on their financial circumstances.  
 
B.  Inconsistent with Public Policy—Crippling Small Manufacturers 
 
A factually dependent post-sale duty to warn is contrary to public policy 
because of its practical, economic consequences for small manufacturers—
consequences that large manufacturers will not share. Small manufacturers are 
already disproportionately affected by products liability law. They are the least 
able to adjust prices to cover the costs of liability or products liability insurance. 
Imposing a factually dependent duty will only exacerbate these disproportionate 
effects. Small manufacturers will now face even higher products liability insurance 
costs, research costs, and actual warning costs. 
Courts specifically reject another products liability law due to concern for its 
adverse effect on small manufacturers. That law is a product-line exception, which 
would make successor companies strictly liable for products sold by the 
predecessor company if the successor continued the product line. Because of the 
potential effects on small manufacturers, many courts reject this product-line 
exception. Courts should follow this reasoning and similarly reject a factually 
dependent post-sale duty to warn. 
 
1.  The Already Vulnerable State of Small Manufacturers 
 
Commentators pointed out a possible disproportionate effect on small 
manufacturers when courts first adopted strict liability for injuries caused by 
defective products. Because of various “economic factors[,] it may often be a 
matter of pure chance as to whether a given manufacturer or industry can adjust its 
price structure to absorb a new cost thrust upon it.”191 Moreover, even if price 
adjustments are possible, “there will always be uninsured defendants, there will 
                                                     
191 Marcus L. Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects 
in Products—An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938, 947 (1957). Professor Plant also 
argued: 
 
Is it sound to assume that manufacturers in general are in a position to 
distribute the risk of all product injuries through the price mechanism? There is 
substantial reason to doubt that such a generalization is valid as to all industries 
or for all manufacturers in a specific industry. . . . For example, certain products 
are subject to what economists call an “elastic demand,” i.e., a slight increase in 
price will cause a sharp reduction in demand or will turn consumers to a 
substitute product. In such industries the product’s price is by no means as 
adjustable as is assumed by the proponents of strict liability. 
 
Id. at 946–47. But see George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical 
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 504 
(1985) (labeling Plant’s criticisms as “hardly compelling and amount[ing] to little more 
than veneration of the status quo”). 
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always be liability in excess of coverage, and there will be members of the group 
whose competitive situation does not permit them to pass on the cost of the 
insurance to their customers.”192  
For a small business, “an increase may mean pricing [itself] out of the 
market.”193 True, some manufacturers are easily able to pass on costs, “[b]ut many 
manufacturers are in a totally different situation. Their position in the industry is 
vulnerable and their competitive situation delicate. It is these comparatively small 
manufacturers who suffer when additional costs are added without regard to their 
situation.”194 The New Hampshire Supreme Court expressed a similar concern: 
“The ‘Fortune 500’ companies suffer less economically because they can develop 
adequate statistics, purchase insurance, and employ expensive experts and legal 
counsel. For thousands of small manufacturers, the high cost of self-protection or 
insurance can be prohibitive so as to force them out of business.”195  
Studies have shown that the increasing cost of products liability insurance has 
affected small manufacturers. In 1976, a Federal Interagency Task Force found the 
costs of product liability insurance had greatly increased, and the “increase 
appeared to have been greater for small, as compared to large, businesses.”196 
Aside from simply being able to afford insurance or spread the costs by increasing 
the prices of products, “[s]mall businesses are less able to bargain effectively for 
favorable insurance rates.”197 A large manufacturer can adapt to retain coverage by 
                                                     
192 William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1121 (1960). 
193 Plant, supra note 191, at 947. 
194 Id. 
195 Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978). 
196 Victor E. Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act—A Brief Overview, 33 
VAND. L. REV. 579, 580 (1980); see also Robert A. Van Kirk, Note, The Evolution of 
Useful Life Statutes in the Products Liability Reform Effort, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1689, 1689–90 
(“Insurance companies insisted that the drastic rise in both claims and awards necessitated 
increases in premiums that many small manufacturers found unaffordable.”). The 
Interagency Task Force made the following “key conclusions about the nature and causes 
of the problem” of increasing costs of products liability insurance: 
 
1. Although the cost of product liability insurance has increased 
substantially in most industries, the problem of increasing costs is severe in only 
a few industries, such as industrial machinery, industrial chemicals, automotive 
components, and pharmaceuticals. 
2. The problem of availability and affordability of product liability 
insurance is concentrated in the small firms in those industries. 
 
1 INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE INSURANCE STUDY ES-7 (1977) [hereinafter 
Task Force]. 
197 Glenn J. Waldrip, Jr., Comment, Limiting Liability: Products Liability and a 
Statute of Repose, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 137, 139 (1980). The Comment also explains that 
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assuming a large deductible or accepting a differently rated plan. “For the smaller 
firm, particularly the single-product firm, these adaptations are not as feasible. The 
account is not large enough for its own experience to have credibility for the 
insurer, and it does not have the financial resources to share a significant 
proportion of the risk burden itself.”198  
Congress has addressed this problem numerous times. In a 1992 committee 
hearing, a Congressman explained that “[t]here is no doubt that the costs and 
perceived inefficiencies of our product liability system are of great concern to the 
small business community.”199 He further explained that “the cost and availability 
of liability insurance was one of the three chief concerns of small businesses in 
[his] home state of Virginia” and that reports demonstrating how the “costs of our 
product liability system fall disproportionately on small businesses are very 
troubling,” particularly since “[m]any have concluded that the liability insurance 
crisis is especially severe for small businesses, in terms of both the cost and the 
availability of insurance.”200 At the same hearing, Professor Kip Viscusi also 
testified that the changes in liability insurance premiums “create particular 
problems for small firms.”201 Those small firms that are unable to self-insure tend 
to “have a less diversified product line so that any particular design defect case will 
tend to hit them harder,” and they “lack some of the economies of scale with 
respect to litigation that larger firms have.”202  
Other committee hearings have focused on the effects of products liability law 
on small manufacturers. As examples, in 1999, a Congressman explained at a 
hearing that the burden of the tort system on “small business defendants is 
magnified. The smallest of businesses are more likely to be uninsured or 
underinsured, which means that one lawsuit puts their economic survival at 
                                                     
the problems associated with obtaining liability insurance are amplified for small 
manufacturers selling machinery that will be used for many years: 
 
For small firms that manufacture nothing but long-life products such as 
industrial machinery, the problem is especially acute. Many of these firms have 
exposures that may amount to 10 to 20 times the current year’s production—i.e. 
machines now in use that were sold over many years’ time. Thus, in developing 
a rate to be applied to the current year’s sales, the insurer must multiply the loss 
potential per machine 10 to 20 times.  
 
Id. at 139–40 (quoting TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at ES-5). 
198 TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at ES-5. 
199 Impact of the Product Liability System on Small Business: J. Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on SBA, the Gen. Econ., & Minority Enter. Dev. & the Subcomm. on Exps., Tax 
Policy, & Spec. Problems of the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 102d Cong. 46 (1992) (statement 
of Hon. Norman Sisisky, Chairman, Subcomm. on Exports, Tax Policy, and Special 
Problems). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 119 (statement of Professor W. Kip Viscusi). 
202 Id. at 119–20. 
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risk . . . .”203 A witness testified that “being sued is one of the most terrifying 
experiences a small business owner can have.”204 In a 2004 hearing, panelists 
described the costs of liability insurance for small manufacturers and the fact that 
some small manufacturers could not afford it and had to pay litigation costs out of 
pocket.205 In 2007, a witness explained to a congressional committee that even 
small settlements can be damaging to a small business: “When you consider that 
many small businesses gross $350,000 or less a year, which does not include 
additional expenses of running the business, like payroll, rent, costs of goods sold, 
and regulatory costs, $5 to $10,000 can significantly impact a small business 
owner’s bottom line.”206 Plus, any settlement, even if small, can drive up insurance 
premium rates.207 
Congress has introduced numerous bills purporting to protect small 
manufacturers.208 The most prominent was the Common Sense Product Liability 
                                                     
203 Small Business Liability Reform Act of 1999: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 7 (1999). 
204 Id. at 96–97 (statement by Roger R. Geiger, State Exec. Director, National 
Federation of Independent Business) (“It is even more frightening for the smallest of small 
businesses who fear being put out of business for good with one lawsuit. . . . More than half 
of Ohio’s small businesses have had to raise the cost of products and services because of 
liability concerns—a cost we as consumers have to pay.”). 
205 See Small Business Liability Reform: Hearing on H.R. 2813 Before the Subcomm. 
on Regulatory Reform and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 108th Cong. 29–30 
(2004) (statement of Lisa Rickard, President, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform) 
(“Very small businesses—those with less than $1 million in annual revenues—pay $33 
billion of the $88 billion per year. That works out to about $17,000 each per year. What’s 
even more astonishing is that these very small businesses pay 44%, or $15 billion, of their 
liability costs out-of-pocket—not through insurance coverage.”); see also id. at 41 
(statement of Jo Rae Wager, President, CTO, Inc.) (“[S]imply, many contracting firms 
can’t afford triple-digit increases in their general liability premiums, that is, if they’re lucky 
enough to find coverage. Often these increases come to companies that have not even had a 
claim; it’s simply the nature of the industry.”). 
206 Full Committee Hearing on Liability Reform and Small Business: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 110th Cong. 8 (2007) (statement of Karen R. Harned, 
Executive Director, National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation). 
207 Id. at 55. 
208 See, e.g., Product Liability Reform Act of 1998, S. 2236, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(3) 
(1998) (proposing nationwide product liability standards and damage limitations, in part, 
because “product liability awards can jeopardize the financial well-being of individuals and 
industries, particularly the Nation’s small businesses”); Product Liability Reform Act of 
1997, S. 648, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (1997) (proposing nationwide product liability 
standards and damage limitations, in part, because “excessive, unpredictable, and often 
arbitrary damage awards and unfair allocations of liability jeopardize the financial well-
being of many individuals as well as entire industries, particularly the Nation’s small 
businesses”); Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 5, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (1997) 
(proposing nationwide product liability standards and damage limitations, in part, because 
“excessive, unpredictable, and often arbitrary damage awards and unfair allocations of 
liability jeopardize the financial well-being of many individuals as well as entire industries, 
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Legal Reform Act of 1996, which contained tort reform measures benefitting both 
small and large manufacturers generally and had bipartisan support in both the 
United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate.209 Despite 
ultimately passing both Houses, President Clinton vetoed it.210 
 
2.  Additional Costs to Small Manufacturers from the Post-Sale Duty 
 
Because a factually dependent post-sale duty to warn is likely to apply to 
small manufacturers, small manufacturers will likely incur additional costs related 
to insurance, research, and issuing post-sale warnings. 
 
(a)  Products Liability Insurance 
 
Generally speaking, “[t]he insurance mechanism . . . works best when losses 
for a class of risks over a period of time are reasonably predictable.”211 Premiums 
can then be set based on those expected risks; ideally, “premiums are set so as to 
exactly relate to the level of risk that the insured’s own conduct occasions.”212  
                                                     
particularly the Nation’s small businesses”); Common Sense Product Liability Legal 
Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (1996) (explaining that “excessive, 
unpredictable, and often arbitrary damage awards and unfair allocations of liability 
jeopardize the financial well-being of many individuals as well as entire industries, 
particularly the Nation’s small businesses”); Common Sense Product Liability Legal 
Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 1075, 104th Cong. §§ 101(a)(6) & (b) (1995) (proposing 
nationwide product liability standards, in part, because “product liability actions and 
punitive damage awards jeopardize the financial well-being of many industries and are a 
particular threat to the viability of the nation’s small businesses”); see also, e.g., Small 
Business Liability Reform Act of 2003, S. 1546, 108th Cong. (2003) (reintroduction of 
Senate Bill 865); Small Business Liability Reform Act of 2003, H.R. 2813, 108th Cong. 
(2003) (House Companion Bill to S. 1546); Small Business Liability Reform Act of 2001, 
S. 865, 107th Cong. (2001) (essentially a reintroduction of S. 1185); Small Business 
Liability Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 1805, 107th Cong. (2001) (House Companion Bill to S. 
865); Small Manufacturer Liability Reform Act of 1999, S. 1185, 106th Cong. (1999); 
Small Business Liability Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 2366, 106th Cong. (1999). The House, 
but not the Senate, ultimately passed House Bill 2366 as the Small Business Liability 
Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 2366, 106th Cong. (2000).  
209 H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996). 
210 See generally H.R. DOC. NO. 104-207 (1996) (message from the President vetoing 
House Bill 956). President Clinton explained that he vetoed the bill because it “tilts the 
playing field against consumers” and “inappropriately intrudes on state authority.” Neil A. 
Lewis, President Vetoes Limits on Liability, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at A22. 
211 TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at 1-1. 
212 Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 
CORNELL L. REV. 313, 320 (1990); see also Isaac Montal, Note, The Consumer 
Expectations Test in New Jersey: What Can Consumers Expect Now?, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 
1381, 1394 (1989) (summarizing insurance industry representatives’ testimony explaining 
the causes of a products liability “insurance crisis,” including that “premiums are based on 
the probability of having to satisfy and defend future claims” but that probability is difficult 
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The level of risk that a manufacturer’s own conduct occasions now includes 
possible liability for a failure to issue a post-sale warning. This is a new form of 
liability for manufacturers. When liability, a loss-producing factor, changes, 
“insurers must respond judgmentally by adjusting their rates to reflect these 
changing loss-producing factors.”213 Rationally then, insurers may need to increase 
premiums. 
Insurers, however, do not need to increase premiums for large manufacturers. 
The level of risk that a large manufacturer’s own conduct occasions would likely 
not include losses due to liability for a post-sale duty to warn. Because the duty is 
factually dependent on the costs of the warning, it is not likely that a large 
manufacturer will owe a duty to warn. It is also not likely that a large manufacturer 
would incur any losses related to a post-sale warning duty. 
Small manufacturers, unlike large manufacturers, are likely to owe a post-sale 
warning duty. Thus, small manufacturers are also likely to incur losses related to a 
post-sale warning duty. Rationally then, insurers should increase the premiums for 
the policies of small manufacturers, but not large manufacturers, because of the 
post-sale obligation.  
The question is how much insurers should increase the premiums for small 
manufacturers. Insurers already have difficulty setting premiums for products 
liability insurance policies because “it is difficult to estimate future losses with any 
degree of accuracy.”214 This is especially true because whether a loss is covered 
depends on whether it arose from an occurrence during the policy period.215 “[I]t 
                                                     
to determine); Waldrip, supra note 197, at 141 (“[D]ecisions concerning both the issuance 
and cost of policies are made by combining an actuarial analysis of loss experience with 
judgmental determinations . . . .”). Professor Schwartz explains that products liability 
insurers use both schedule rating and experience rating to set premiums. Schedule rating 
includes adjustments to premiums based on “information yielded by an inspection or 
survey of the insured’s operations.” Schwartz, supra, at 320. Premiums may thus be 
adjusted based on precautions the manufacturer takes in designing or manufacturing 
products. Id. Experience rating looks to the insured’s history of claims as a proxy for future 
risk. Id. 
Insurers also consider the number of products sold when determining premiums. Id. at 
318 n.21 (explaining that the “premiums for products liability insurance are calculated as a 
predetermined percentage of dollars of sales,” meaning the “premium [is] a direct function 
of the number of products sold”). Thus, the insurance premiums for small manufacturers 
with fewer customers should be smaller than the premiums for large manufacturers. 
Despite this, studies have shown that small manufacturers still have a more difficult time 
obtaining and affording liability insurance. See supra notes 196–198 and accompanying 
text. 
213 TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at 1-5. The Report explains that insurers must adjust 
their rates “when new legal precedents limit defenses.” Id. 
214 Waldrip, supra note 197, at 141; see also TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at 1-2 
(explaining that “[m]ost companies also require a survey by a loss control specialist before 
writing liability coverage for products they consider particularly risky”). 
215 In the typical products liability policy, the insurer agrees to defend and pay “all 
sums that [the insured] will become legally obligated to pay as damages arising out of an 
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does not matter when the product was manufactured or sold, or whether it existed 
at the time the insurer underwrote the policy.”216 This aspect of coverage—that the 
insurance could cover injuries caused by products sold years before—“has been 
cited as the cause of severe problems.”217 The most difficult problem is that “[t]he 
underwriter is faced with the possibility that any one of the insured’s existing 
products, including products manufactured over 20 years ago, could cause a loss 
under the current policy.”218  
This inability to predict the losses “is, according to most insurers, a major 
obstacle to underwriting decisions.”219 Simply because there is no other way to set 
rates, “[r]ates for product liability insurance are based largely or, for some 
products, entirely on nonstatistically derived, judgmental estimates of loss 
frequency and severity.”220  
The difficulty of setting fair premiums will only increase as insurers begin to 
contemplate losses due to post-sale warnings. A post-sale duty to warn arises when 
a manufacturer learns (or should learn) of a danger after selling the product. 
Whether that danger will materialize is, almost by definition, an uncertainty. The 
severity of that unknown danger, and the resulting loss, is also uncertain.  
Plus, the danger could materialize two weeks after sale, or twenty years after 
sale.221 The uncertainty of potential point-of-sale liability arising “from old 
                                                     
occurrence or loss event causing bodily injury or property damage.” TASK FORCE, supra 
note 196, at 1-14. 
216 Id.; see also Waldrip, supra note 197, at 141 (explaining that the insurer can 
become legally obligated to pay damages resulting from products sold before the policy 
was in place). 
217 TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at 1-14. 
218 Id. at 1-15; Waldrip, supra note 197, at 141–42 (explaining that difficulty of 
determining premiums increases because insurers are “forced to set their present premiums 
at a level sufficient to satisfy potential claims arising from old products that are or could be 
still in use”). 
219 TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at 1-20. 
220 Id. at 1-40; see also Laurie L. Kratky, Statutes of Repose in Products Liability: 
Death Before Conception?, 37 SW. L.J. 665, 676 (1983) (explaining that the “increasing 
number and average dollar amount of products liability claims and awards” combined with 
the “highly subjective methods of insurance rate-making” have contributed to a dramatic 
increase in the premiums of products liability policies); Waldrip, supra note 197, at 141–
42. 
Two types of rates exist for the basic limits of a policy. Manual rates are derived from 
data that insurance companies have submitted to the Insurance Services Office regarding 
premiums, losses, and exposures. TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at 1-36. This data is then 
analyzed actuarially. Id. Even though this “basic rate is based on aggregate experience, 
some judgment may be involved in selecting the appropriate classification.” Id. at 1-38. If 
insufficient data exists to calculate a rate through actuarial techniques, a “(a) rate” is 
determined based “primarily on judgment.” Id. at 1-36. This judgment based (a) rate is also 
often used to determine premiums when insurance policy limits exceed $300,000 for bodily 
injury and $50,000 or $100,000 for property damage. Id. at 1-37. 
221 A statute of repose could cut off the possibility of liability at some point if the state 
legislature has adopted one. Madden, supra note 24, at 38–39 (“It would . . . seem to follow 
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products that are or could be still in use . . . contributed to liability premiums 
increases of over one thousand percent for some manufacturers.”222 Liability for 
the post-sale warning obligation is, almost by definition, based on old products that 
are or could still be in use that were, or should have been, discovered to be 
dangerous. True, the passage of time may make a factually dependent post-sale 
duty to warn less likely to exist, as even a small manufacturer may have difficulty 
identifying users after a long passage of time.223 But the passage of time is not 
determinative, meaning liability is still possible, causing even more uncertainty in 
the estimation of future losses. 
There is little doubt that post-sale warning liability will cause substantial 
uncertainty about a small manufacturer’s potential losses. If any substantial 
uncertainty exists, the underwriter is forced “to be very cautious, which, in turn, 
affects the cost and availability of insurance.”224 Really, the insurer has only two 
options—either not issue the insurance policy, or set the “premiums high enough 
to prepare for the worst possibilities.”225 Either consequence is enough to drive the 
manufacturer needing the insurance out of business. Without insurance, the small 
manufacturer likely would be unable to survive even one judgment. With 
insurance, the small manufacturer would be unlikely to afford the premiums and 
yet continue in business.  
Small manufacturers need to obtain products liability insurance to cover the 
risk of loss resulting from a post-sale warning because they (and not large 
                                                     
that upon exhaustion of an applicable state repose period, a seller’s potential liability for 
any post-sale warning or other product-related obligation would likewise cease.”). 
222 Waldrip, supra note 197, at 142; see also TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at ES-7 
(explaining that one factor contributing to “increasing claim costs” is “a manufacturer’s 
liability for products made years ago”); Kratky, supra note 220, at 676 (“[T]he uncertainty 
associated with products that have been in use for many years . . . caused many insurers to 
engage in ‘panic-pricing.’ Unknown liability for an equally unknown number of years has 
led to a worst-case type of analysis.”). 
223 Hanlan v. Chandler, No. 4-0259B, 2008 WL 5608253, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Nov. 13, 2008) (finding no post-sale duty to warn under the Third Restatement because 
“the crane accident occurred about thirty years after [the manufacturer] first sold the crane” 
and “[t]he crane changed hands at least three times in those thirty years,” precluding the 
ability of the manufacturer to identify those needing to be warned). 
224 Waldrip, supra note 197, at 141. 
225 Id. at 142; see also Kratky, supra note 220, at 676 (explaining that as a result of 
the uncertainty of future losses, “many insurers have either refused to issue products 
liability policies altogether or have set premiums so high as to make them effectively 
unavailable”). True, small manufacturers can avoid liability by actually issuing the post-
sale warning, reducing the chance that the insured manufacturer will incur losses. From the 
insurer’s perspective, however, there is no guarantee that the small manufacturer will 
actually issue the warning. Plus, if the ability to avoid liability was a reason to not insure a 
risk, then an insurer would also not insure losses related to liability for point-of-sale 
warning obligations. Even though a manufacturer will not be liable if it warns of dangers it 
knows of or should know of, manufacturers still obtain and insurers still issue insurance for 
losses caused by liability for a point-of-sale warning. 
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manufacturers) are most likely to face liability related to a post-sale warning. 
Small manufacturers are also, however, the manufacturers already most likely 
unable to afford the costs of products liability insurance. And the cost of that 
insurance is only likely to increase as more jurisdictions adopt a post-sale warning 
obligation. 
 
(b)  Research 
 
Other potentially expensive costs also exist. Mainly, this includes costs 
associated with ongoing research regarding possible dangers hidden in products. A 
factually dependent post-sale duty does not expressly obligate a manufacturer to 
research its products after sale. It does, however, make the manufacturer liable if it 
fails to warn of dangers about which it should have known. The dangers about 
which it should have known are the dangers that ongoing research would have 
revealed.226 Thus, to avoid liability for a failure to issue a post-sale warning, a 
small manufacturer will need to continue to research the dangers of its products.227 
This research could be very expensive.228 Small manufacturers will be forced to 
incur the costs of this continuing research, but large manufacturers will not. 
 
(c)  Costs of Actually Issuing the Post-Sale Warning 
 
If the obligation to issue a post-sale warning exists under the factually 
dependent version of the duty, the costs of actually issuing that warning are 
reasonable. Even if reasonable though, there are still costs associated with issuing 
the warning. The costs include expenses related to the logistics of issuing the 
warning itself—producing the post-sale warning itself and communicating that 
warning to the manufacturer’s customers.  
If these costs are extensive and unreasonable, as they likely will be for a 
larger manufacturer, a manufacturer will not have to incur them because it will not 
be obligated to issue the post-sale warning. But if the costs are reasonable, as they 
likely will be for a smaller manufacturer, the small manufacturer will have to incur 
                                                     
226 See Richter v. Limax Int’l, Inc., 45 F.3d 1464, 1470–71 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming 
jury’s verdict finding liability for a failure to warn that jogging on a trampoline could cause 
stress fractures because plaintiff’s evidence showed that reasonable tests would have 
revealed that foreseeable danger). 
227 See Ross, supra note 15, at 345 (explaining how a post-sale duty to warn “may 
require manufacturers to investigate when reasonable grounds exist for the seller to suspect 
that a hitherto unknown risk exists”); see also Kenneth Ross & J. David Prince, Post-Sale 
Duties: The Most Expansive Theory in Products Liability, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 963, 969 
(2009) (“The language in section 10 could be used to argue that the scope of other 
manufacturers’ and suppliers’ legal duties are extended by requiring reasonable affirmative 
actions to learn of post-sale product risks.”). 
228 See Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1528–29 (D. Minn. 1989) 
(discussing limiting a post-sale duty to situations where the manufacturer knows of the 
danger to alleviate the potentially “crushing burden on manufacturers to retest products”). 
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them and issue the warning. Thus, a small manufacturer will likely have to spend 
money issuing post-sale warnings, but a larger manufacturer likely will not. 
 
3.  Courts’ Concern for Small Manufacturers as the Main Reason to Reject the 
Product-Line Exception 
 
Potentially devastating economic consequences for small manufacturers—the 
same consequences that could very well result from the imposition of a factually 
dependent post-sale duty to warn—are the very reason that numerous courts have 
rejected another specific products liability law. That law is a product-line 
exception to the general rule that a successor company cannot be strictly liable for 
products manufactured and sold by the predecessor corporation.229 The product-
line exception would impose strict liability on the successor if it “continues the 
output” of the line of products.230  
The Florida Supreme Court rejected the product-line exception “due in part to 
the threat of economic annihilation that small businesses would face under such a 
rule of expanded liability. Because of their limited assets, small corporations 
would face financial destruction from imposition of liability for their predecessor’s 
products.”231  
An Illinois court also rejected the exception because of small manufacturers’ 
inability to obtain insurance: 
 
Recent studies indicate that many manufacturers, and in particular small 
manufacturers, have a difficult problem obtaining products liability 
insurance and find it impossible to cover the risks by raising prices 
because they have to compete with larger manufacturers who can keep 
the price down. . . . Additionally, it is one thing to assume that a 
manufacturer can acquire insurance against potential liability for its own 
products and another to assume it can acquire such insurance for the 
products made by a different manufacturer. We do not know whether 
insurance companies will readily provide such insurance. We cannot 
assume it as fact.232  
 
Numerous other state courts have agreed.233 Courts are concerned about how 
this rule, obligating all successor manufacturers, would affect small manufacturers. 
                                                     
229 See Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1982). 
230 Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977). 
231 Bernard, 409 So. 2d at 1049. 
232 Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1111 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1982). 
233 Johnston v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Colo. App. 1992) 
(expressly rejecting the product-line exception and citing concern for small manufacturer 
as a motivating rationale); Guzman v. MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E.2d 929, 932–33 (Mass. 1991) 
(same); Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 99–100 (Minn. 1989) (same); 
Simoneau v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 409 (N.H. 1988) (same); Semenetz v. 
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Courts should similarly be concerned with how a factually dependent post-sale 
duty, which possibly will apply only to small manufacturers, would affect those 
manufacturers. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
One would not expect too many complaints about a law that imposes 
obligations only if those obligations are reasonable. How could a law be unfair or 
problematic if it imposes liability only if conduct is unreasonable?  
                                                     
Sherling & Walden, Inc., 851 N.E.2d 1170, 1173–75 (N.Y. 2006) (same); Downtowner, 
Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 122–25 (N.D. 1984) (same); Simmons v. 
Mark Lift Indus., Inc., 622 S.E.2d 213, 215 (S.C. 2005) (same); Griggs v. Capitol Mach. 
Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287, 294 n.5 (Tex. App. 1985) (same); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool 
Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984) (same); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 
825–29 (Wis. 1985) (same); see also Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 570 (Md. 1991) 
(rejecting the continuity of enterprise exception finding successor liability because “not 
only would liability be imposed upon ‘a major corporation,’ but it would also be imposed 
upon the small business operation which may not be in a position to spread the risk or 
insure against it”); Debra Ann Schiff, Products Liability and Successor Corporations: 
Protecting the Product User and the Small Manufacturer Through Increased Availability 
of Products Liability Insurance, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1000, 1003–04 (1980) (noting that 
most small companies are unable to obtain policies covering liability for injuries caused by 
a predecessor’s products). But see Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 822–23 
(N.J. 1981) (recognizing “legitimate concerns” for small manufacturers that arise as a 
consequence of adopting the product-line exception, but concluding that such “concerns, 
genuine as they may be, cannot be permitted to overshadow the basic social policy, now so 
well-entrenched in [New Jersey] jurisprudence, that favors imposition of the costs of 
injuries from defective products on the manufacturing enterprise and consuming public 
rather than on the innocent injured party”); Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., No. CV 920339263, 
1996 WL 469716 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996) (same); Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 
P.2d 243, 249–50 (N.M. 1997) (same); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 604 (Wash. 
1984) (same). 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court described this “very real threat” to small 
manufacturers as an “issue[] of broad public policy involving balancing the interests of 
future plaintiffs and defendants, which the Legislature is better equipped to resolve.” 
Guzman, 567 N.E.2d at 932–33. Two state courts that rejected a post-sale duty also noted 
that the issue should be resolved by the legislature instead of a court. Campbell v. Gala 
Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A.6:04-2036-RBH, 2006 WL 1073796, at *5 (D.S.C. Apr. 20, 2006) 
(refusing to “legislate from the bench”); Palmer v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 905 So. 2d 
564, 601 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (refusing to recognize a post-sale duty to warn “in the 
absence of legislative action”). Those courts did not cite the consequences to small 
manufacturers as a reason for the legislature being better equipped to resolve the existence 
of a post-sale duty to warn. But if the legislature is best equipped to evaluate the potential 
consequences to small manufacturers that will result from the product-line exception, it 
may similarly be best equipped to evaluate the consequences to small manufacturers that 
will result from a factually dependent post-sale duty to warn. 
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But what is reasonable for one manufacturer may not be reasonable for 
another depending on the manufacturer’s circumstances. If a manufacturer has 
only a few customers, it is reasonable to obligate that manufacturer to contact those 
few customers to warn them. But if a manufacturer has thousands of customers, 
such an obligation would likely not be reasonable because of its expense. Because 
of the cost, it is reasonable for the large manufacturer to not warn. 
Unintentionally, a factually dependent post-sale duty to warn creates a 
scenario where small manufacturers are more likely than large manufacturers to 
owe a duty to warn after the sale and be liable if they breach that duty. Further, it 
creates a scenario where customers of small manufacturers are more likely to 
receive and benefit from a post-sale warning, whereas customers of large 
manufacturers will be left without that safety benefit: 
 
Is it credible to have a body of law that permits a cause of action for a 
person who suffers serious burns when his custom-made suit, made of 
readily flammable material, catches fire, whereas the person who suffers 
identical injuries from a department-store suit made of the same material 
recovers nothing?234  
 
The obvious answer is no. But that is exactly what a factually dependent post-
sale duty does. It is also exactly why courts should not adopt a factually dependent 
post-sale duty to warn.  
Essentially, courts are left with only two options in adopting or modifying a 
post-sale warning obligation: obligate all manufacturers regardless of the costs, or 
reject any post-sale duty to warn because the costs of warning are too burdensome. 
The first option is unlikely given the widespread belief that a post-sale duty to 
warn would be very burdensome on manufacturers. The solution to that burden is 
not to adopt a duty that would exist only if the costs are reasonable—that factually 
dependent duty is more likely to obligate small manufacturers than large 
manufacturers. Instead, the solution to that burden is to reject any post-sale duty to 
warn.  
                                                     
234 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products 
Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919, 
1942 (2010). Professors Goldberg and Zipursky made this point in response to an argument 
made by Professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell. Polinsky & Shavell, supra 
note 178, at 1452. Generally, Professors Polinsky and Shavell argued the costs of liability 
outweighed the benefits in improving product safety, especially when other mechanisms 
exist to improve product safety—mainly government regulation and the market. See id. at 
1452. They admitted, however, that the conclusion applies better to widely sold products. 
Id. Professors Goldberg and Zipursky questioned the legitimacy of a products liability 
system that would apply to small manufacturers, but not large ones. See Goldberg & 
Zipursky, supra, at 1942. The point applies equally as well to a factually dependent post-
sale duty to warn. 
